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HOME RULE, LOCAL AUTONOMY, AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
BEHAVIOR 
 
This dissertation focuses on relationships between state and local governments. Of 
particular interest in this project is how the shift of power from the state to local 
governments changes local governments’ performance. This dissertation is comprised of 
four chapters. The first chapter briefly introduces the motivation and organization of the 
dissertation. The second chapter reviews the three state-imposed fiscal institutions—home 
rule, debt limitations, and tax and expenditure limitations, across states. While previous 
studies have looked at specific institutions, few studies have comprehensively reviewed 
the status of those institutions across states. This chapter attempts to fill this gap by 
comprehensively scrutinizing those institutions.  
The third chapter investigates the impact of home rule on municipalities’ revenues. 
Although long governed by “Dillon’s Rule” that makes localities a “creature” of the state, 
American municipalities have always desired at least some degree of local autonomy. One 
of the ways in which states grant autonomy to local governments ins through a designation 
of “home rule.” Most prior studies of the effects of home rule on local governance have 
focused on relating large municipalities. This chapter explores the effect of adopting home 
rule on small municipalities by looking at municipalities’ revenues. Focusing on Illinois 
municipalities, this chapter conducts a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to provide 
causal evidence. The empirical evidence shows that the adoption of home rule has a 
significant and large impact on the level of total own-source revenue, especially for local 
sales taxes and other taxes, but it has limited influence on property taxes. In addition, while 
home rule significantly increases revenue diversification for small municipalities, it has 
little influence on revenue stability. 
The fourth chapter investigates how home rule changes local governments’ 
performance by exploring its impacts on cities’ expenditure policy. Traditional theory 
predicts that local governments are more likely to place developmental expenditures 
policies ahead of either redistributive or allocational policies. Because they operate in an 
environment that they have to compete for residents and businesses to create their fiscal 
base. This chapter also conducts a fuzzy regression discontinuity design focusing on 
municipalities in Illinois where the adoption of home rule changes exogenously at a given 
population threshold. The empirical evidence shows that the adoption of home rule has 
significant and positive effects on allocational expenditures. Unlike the prediction of 
traditional theory, developmental and redistributive expenditures experience little change 
with the home rule power. This dissertation concludes by discussing implications and 
suggesting future research directions. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
The issues of the division of labor between levels of governments have been widely 
debated for years. Traditionally, assuming government as a benevolent agent, the national 
government is charged with providing homogenous public goods across jurisdictions and 
addressing spillovers across state borders. That is because it is efficient for the national 
government to do so but also because the national government wants to avoid political 
consequences that result from differentiating the provision of public goods to jurisdictions 
(Vo, 2010). 
However, the preferences of residents are heterogeneous across localities, uniform 
public goods provided by the national government cannot fully satisfy all residents, which 
makes subnational governments play a role in providing heterogeneous public goods. More 
important, local governments provide public goods efficiently because residents sort 
heterogeneously according to preferences for public goods (Tiebout, 1956) and they know 
the demand of residents due to their information advantages.  
While the traditional theory looks at the general assignment of functions to different 
levels of government, the new perspective of literature pays much attention to the 
importance of inter-jurisdictional competition. For example, subnational governments 
preserve market incentives because they expect some revenues from the firms to be used 
for local public goods provision (Qian and Weingast 1997). Also, yardstick competition 
2 
 
may enhance political accountability. The effort or competence of public officials is not 
directly observable by citizens, and if poor results occur, local officials can always plead 
that they did the best that was possible under the circumstances. However, “if the shocks 
that create a wedge between effort and outcomes are correlated across jurisdictions, then 
yardstick competition can act as an indicator of relative effort on the part of agents” 
(Bardhan, 2002, p.191).  
In sum, traditional fiscal federalism literature believes that local governance is 
efficient in providing services due to inter-jurisdictional competition, incentives, and 
information advantage. The Oates theorem represents these theories that in the presence of 
diverse preferences and demands, social welfare can be maximized when public goods are 
provided by local governments rather than a central government (Oates et al., 1972). 
Falling under the umbrella of fiscal federalism, local governments usually are 
viewed as a Tiebout government that sorts residents through competition of providing 
heterogeneous public goods. However, Tiebout’s model omits the supply side of public 
goods provision (Oates 1981, Prud’Homme 1995), such as the influence of institutions. 
Practically, the role of local governments in providing services faces a lot of constraints 
from both the federal and state levels, especially those constraints placed by the state. Local 
governments are creatures of the states, meaning that the power and authority they possess 
are determined by state constitution (Richardson et al. 2003). States establish various 
institutions and rules to control the authority of local governments, including Dillon’s Rule, 
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home rule, debt limitations, tax and expenditure limitations, and balanced budget 
requirements. That is partly because they want to prevent local officials from corruption 
and mismanagement associated with abuses of the public purse (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 
2001).  
Some of those institutions, such as home rule, shift the governing power from the 
state to local governments and devolve fiscal responsibility toward the local level as well. 
Other institutions, in contrast, limit local power to what the state delegates to it and restrict 
local discretion in making policies. No matter what those institutions regulate, they all 
change the state-local relationship to some degree. Although the general purpose of the 
state-imposed institutions is to make local governments more efficient and more 
accountable in managing local affairs, the consequences of those, however, are always at 
the center stage of policy debate. The believer of decentralization argues that greater 
autonomy on making fiscal policies help localities improve local public goods and service 
provision according to local citizens’ preference (Tiebout 1956; Krane, Rigos, and Hill 
2001). On the other hand, some scholars argue that state government control ensures 
greater uniformity of services provision; and states possess more technical expertise and 
professional capacity; and, state controls can prevent local officials from too much leeway 
which may result in local leviathans (Richardson, Gough, and Puentes 2003). 
The effects of those institutions on local governance particularly need to be 
revisited because of the changes of the fiscal landscape for local governments after the 
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2001 Recession and the Great Recession. States have been shifting more responsibilities 
and burdens to the local governments because of the purpose of circumventing restrictions 
and their fiscal difficulties. For example, state governments usually face a stringent debt 
limit so that they turned to municipal corporations as sources of capital; and, some states 
even use local governments as surrogates for state economic development activities (Krane, 
Rigos, and Hill 2001).  
Meanwhile, many states are offering local governments less financial help than they 
were before the recession. This decline of state aid will not change anytime soon since the 
sluggish state revenue growth does not bode well for a return to pre-recession aid levels. 
Local governments and school districts received total intergovernmental revenues from 
states that has increased only 10 percent since 2000, whereas the own-source revenues have 
grown 29 percent (Maciag and Wogan 2017). Given that the fiscal aid from the federal 
government to local governments had declined after the 1980s (Mullins and Pagano 2005), 
local governments have to take more responsibility without sufficient aid from the higher 
level of governments. How do those state-imposed institutions play a role in local 
governance in this new normal era? This dissertation specifically concerns with home rule, 
which grants localities more autonomy, and intends to examine its impacts on 





The broad purpose of this dissertation is to explore relationships between state and 
local governments. Of particular interest in this project is how the shift of power from the 
state to local governments through state-imposed institutions. The Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR 1993) researched state institutions on local fiscal 
administration about two decades ago. The institution may have developed with the 
changing local landscape; it may be worthwhile to update the status of how the institution 
distributed. Chapter 2 scrutinizes the status of three institutions—home rule, debt limits, 
and TELs across and within states. 
Next, this dissertation intends to provide more evidence of how a change in state-
local power affects local governance. This project specifically concerns with home rule, 
which provides local government more discretion in solving problems to improve local 
public goods and service provision and protects local governments from interference by 
state government. To do so, Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the consequences of home rule 
adoption by looking at its impacts on local fiscal and spending policies. In the state-local 
relations, the revenue side has always been a policy battleground. Traditionally, to prevent 
local governments from financial mismanagements, local governments may exercise only 
those powers expressly granted by the state under Dillon’s Rule which derived from the 
two court decisions issued by Judge John F. Dillon of Iowa in 1868 (Richard 2003; 
Zimmerman 1995). On the other hand, the public services provided by local governments 
are relatively more similar across localities than the taxes are since most cities have to offer 
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the same functions such as polices. But the quality and the costs of the services may vary 
with cities (Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle, 2004). One can investigate the changes in local 
service provision by looking at the adjustments of local expenditures. While those policies 
do not necessarily make huge differences in residents’ welfare, the observation of local 
governments’ fiscal and expenditure behavior reflects their policy intention. 
 
Organization 
This dissertation consists of four sections. The next chapter is a general sketch of 
three state-imposed institutions on local governments—home rule, debt limitations, and 
tax and expenditure limitations (TELs). It particularly scrutinizes the status of those three 
institutions across and within states. The following two chapters investigate the 
consequences of the institution by focusing on home rule and examining the impacts of 
home rule adoption on local governments. In particular, the third explores the effect of 
adopting home rule on municipalities by looking at municipalities’ revenues. The fourth 
chapter investigates the effect of adopting home rule from the perspective of expenditure 
policies. The last chapter concludes by summarizing the findings, discussing contributions, 





CHAPTER TWO: STATE-IMPOSED FISCAL INSTITUTIONS  
The Constitution of the United States makes no mention of local governments, 
leaving the space for states. There was a question of whether local governments are 
jurisdictions of federal or state governments. But the Tenth Amendment reserves authority-
giving powers to the states. Dillon’s Rule regards local governments as political 
subdivisions of the state, leading to a great diversity in state-local relations between, and 
even within, states. It is not only Dillon’s Rule that affects the power of localities to self-
govern. States establish various rules and institutions for shaping the power of local 
governments, including home rule, tax and expenditure limitations, and debt limitations, 
through which states can constrain municipalities on the type of taxes they can use and the 
rates they can institute (Denison, Hackbart, Moody 2006; Mullins and Pagano 2005). The 
consequences of those institutions are beyond a changing of the state-local relationship but 
may affect the well being of residents. 
Even though some previous studies have looked at specific institutions, few studies 
have comprehensively reviewed the status of those institutions across states. This chapter 
attempts to fill this gap by reviewing the three state-imposed fiscal institutions—home rule, 
debt limitations, and tax and expenditure limitations, across states. 
 
Home Rule vs Dillon’s Rule 
Local governments are legal creatures of the states in the American federal system 
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under Dillon’s Rule, which is derived from the two court decisions issued by Judge John F. 
Dillon of Iowa in 1868. It affirms the previously held, narrow interpretation of a local 
government's authority, in which a locality may exercise only those powers expressly 
granted by the state. It creates a framework where local governments are strictly limited to 
what the state delegates to it. Also. Dillon’s Rule states that if there is a reasonable doubt 
whether a power has been conferred to a local government, then the power has not been 
conferred. Otherwise, the state has the power to modify or revoke local powers. The state 
can place whatever restrictions they choose on their localities, as long as such rules don't 
violate the state's constitution. Local governments, then, exist to perform the tasks of state 
governments at the local level (Richardson 2011). 
The origin of Dillon’s Rule is related to the debate over the degree of local 
government autonomy because of the emergence of two financial mismanagements in the 
1800s: “(1) the patronage-based awarding of utility franchises; and, (2) the deliberate 
creation and extinguishment of municipalities to avoid accumulated debt. These actions 
prompted litigation in various state courts over the role played by local governments in 
economic activities.” (Richardson 2003, 7). There are 39 Dillon’s Rule states across the 
nation (Richardson 2011). Eight states include Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee apply Dillon’s Rule to only certain local 
governments. Most of those 8 states grant municipalities rather than counties home rule 




The advocates of Dillon’ rule say that the state can create uniform tax codes and 
licensing policies, which enhance states’ business-friendly environment. Without 
commonality between local governments on these issues, businesses find more red tape 
than opportunity, making it difficult for the state and businesses to prosper. From the 
efficiency perspective, some argue that state governments can address local issues more 
efficiently because state-level control ensures greater uniformity and states possess more 
technical expertise (Richardson 2003). On the other hand, Dillon’s Rule requires that local 
officials spend a considerable amount of time lobbying the state legislature to approve bills 
granting local authority and disapprove bills imposing restrictions on them. Moreover, 
local governments find it relatively difficult to tailor policies according to local needs under 
the restrictions of Dillon’s Rule. 
Although long governed by Dillon’s Rule that makes localities a “creature” of the 
state, American municipalities have always desired at least some degree of local autonomy. 
Some states provide specific rights known as home rule for municipalities and counties to 
circumvent Dillon’s rule. Home rule, in general, is defined as “the ability of a local 
government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been designated to be of 
statewide interest through general law, state constitutional provisions, or initiatives and 
referenda” (Krane, Rigos, and Hill, 2001, p.2). The goal of home rule is to give localities 
more discretion in making policies, solving problems to improve local public goods and 
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service provision, and protecting local governments from interference by the state 
government. 
Home rule units are usually granted more power of self-governance, including 
taxing, policing, and zoning, but it takes various forms and contains different scopes of 
power among states. Scholars have categorized home rule based on the legal basis on which 
it is grounded. The first type of home rule is the original home rule. Original home rule 
states required a city should exercise those powers explicitly granted in their charter. 
The other type of home rule is home-rule grant, which is a “Fordham’s devolution 
of power” in that home rule powers are granted directly by the state constitution to all 
localities and do not depend on the home rule charter adoption (Weeks and Hardy, 1984), 
which gives home rule units a substantial self-governance power. For instance, Illinois 
firstly adopted a “legislative home rule” that home rule units could act unless explicitly 
prohibited by state law (Krane, Rigos, and Hill, 2001). This type of classification, however, 
does not make explicit the extent of local discretion and local discretionary authority varies 
from state to state.  
After Missouri adopted a constitutional home rule provision in 1875, several 
states—California (1879), Washington (1889), Minnesota (1896), Colorado (1902), 
Virginia (1902), Oregon (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan (1908), Arizona (1912), Ohio 
(1912), Nebraska (1912), and Texas (1912)—followed by establishing constitutional 
authority allowing localities to gain forms of home rule power (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 
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2001). Up to 2015, 40 states have adopted constitutional home rule (Russell and Bostrom, 
2016). In recent years, home rule has been prevalent again. Among non-home-rule states, 
Nevada passed home rule legislation that took effect on July 2015; West Virginia conducted 
a home rule pilot program in a few cities in March 2007, and established a phase II program 
that involved more cities in November of 2012. 
Because home rule grants local governments discretion in policymaking, scholars 
often view home rule as the expansion of local autonomy and decentralization of power. 
The devolution of power by home rule reshapes state-local relations. Many scholars have 
used it in the measure of local autonomy. Zimmerman (1981) incorporates the presence of 
home rule in the index of local discretionary authority for gauging the variation in state-
local systems. Building on Zimmerman’s (1981) index, Hill (1993) also includes home rule 
in the measurement of local government structure. To further capture the variation of the 
power of home rule, he further categorizes home rule by whether it is established by state 
constitution or by general law, and by whether home rule applies to broad or limited 
functions. 
Home Rule in the States  
There are 40 states granting home rule to localities, of which 32 provide for home 
rule in their state constitutions. Ten out of those 32 states require enabling legislation, and 
the other 22 states allow home rule units to be self-executing without the approval from 
legislation. Meanwhile, the other 8 states provide for home rule through legislative statutes, 
including Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
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and North Carolina.   
Some states treat types of local governments differently. States usually offer home 
rule to general purpose governments such as county and city but not to special purpose 
governments. Even though county and city governments could adopt home rule power from 
the state, states are more generous in granting home rule power to the city. Fourteen states 
do not have home rule for city governments, while county governments in thirteen states 
cannot adopt home rule.1 However, the state governments that provide home rule for both 
county and city governments offer a higher level of local autonomy to city governments 
than to county governments. City governments in thirteen states have more local autonomy 
than their county counterpart, while county governments in only five states are granted 
more autonomy compared to city governments, based on Turnbull and Geon (2006). 
Counties are less motivated to adopt home rule. While Illinois, Minnesota, Texas, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Virginia allow their county governments to adopt home rule, 
only one or two counties have adopted home rule in each state. Those counties often are 
large counties, implying that large local governments are more likely to obtain more local 
autonomy. 
Some states not only treat various types of localities differently but also treat the 
sizes of localities differently. Many states only apply home rule to municipalities with 
certain population levels. Arizona, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
 
1 Hawaii has no municipal governments, only county governments. Although Connecticut, Rhode Island and 
Vermont are divided into counties, there is no county government in those states.  
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Washington have a population threshold for localities to adopt home rule, although the 
thresholds are different ranging from 2,000 to 25,000. The population thresholds imply that 
those states worry about small localities’ capability of possessing a high degree of 
discretionary authority in serving their communities. Illinois is a good example to illustrate 
states’ differential policies toward localities. While Illinois allows both county and 
municipality governments to adopt home rule, county governments have to adopt an 
executive form of government before the adoption of home rule. Home rule in Illinois only 
applies to cities with a population of at least 25,000 people. In cities with populations fewer 
than 25,000, Dillon’s Rule applies. 
More importantly, home rule and Dillon’s Rule are two parallel systems that could 
coexist within a state. Thirty-one states apply both Dillon’s Rule and home rule to localities. 
That is, some localities are granted home rule power, while others operate under Dillon’s 
Rule. Table 2.1 lists how Dillon’s Rule and home rule are used by state. Specifically, 
Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and 
Vermont only have their municipality and county government subject to either Dillon’s 
Rule or home rule. 
The discretionary authority of home rule varies by state. Previous studies have 
attempted to measure that variation. Turnbull and Geon (2006) used home rule and Dillon’s 
Rule as a direct measure for the degree of local autonomy. They classify the degree of local 
autonomy into four categories: strong Dillon’s Rule (little or no local autonomy), weak 
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Dillon’s Rule, weak home rule, and strong home rule (a large degree of local autonomy). 
These efforts to define local government autonomy using Dillon’s Rule and home rule as 
the beginning metrics have been criticized recently because of the coexistence of Dillon’s 
Rule and home rule (Richardson, 2011). This index remains the most comprehensive index 
efforts scholars have developed.   
 
Table 2.1 Dillon’s Rule and home rule use by state 








Alabama N Y N N 
Alaska N N Y Y 
Arizona Y Y Y Y 
Arkansas Y Y Y Y 
California Y Y Y Y 
Colorado Y N Y Y 
Connecticut Y Y Y N 
Delaware Y Y Y N 
Florida N* N* Y Y 
Georgia Y Y Y Y 
Hawaii Y Y Y Y 
Idaho Y N N Y 
Illinois Y N Y N 
Indiana Y N N Y 
Iowa N N Y Y 
Kansas Y N Y Y 
Kentucky Y Y Y Y 
Louisiana Y N Y Y 
Maine Y Y Y Y 
Maryland Y Y N Y 
Massachusetts N N N Y 
Michigan Y Y Y Y 
Minnesota Y Y Y Y 
Mississippi Y Y N N 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Missouri Y Y Y Y 
Montana N N Y Y 
Nebraska Y Y Y Y 
Nevada Y Y Y N 
New Hampshire Y Y Y Y 
New Jersey N N Y Y 
New Mexico N N Y N 
New York Y Y N Y 
North Carolina Y Y Y Y 
North Dakota Y Y Y Y 
Ohio N N Y Y 
Oklahoma Y Y Y N 
Oregon N N Y Y 
Pennsylvania Y Y Y Y 
Rhode Island Y Y N N 
South Carolina N N N Y 
South Dakota Y Y N Y 
Tennessee Y N Y Y 
Texas Y Y Y N 
Utah N N Y Y 
Vermont Y Y N N 
Virginia Y Y N Y 
Washington Y Y Y Y 
West Virginia Y Y N** N 
Wisconsin Y Y N Y 
Wyoming Y Y Y N 
Source: Coester (2004), Richardson (2011) and Russell and Bostrom (2016).  
Note: It is unclear if Florida adopts Dillon’s Rule since it has a conflicting authority. West 
Virginia had been conducting a home rule pilot until 2019. 
 
To further illustrate the distribution of home rule power across states, this study 
adopts the index proposed by Turnbull and Geon (2006) and updates it to 2015. Specifically, 
twelve states are strong home rule states for county governments. Nine states are weak 
home rule states. Eleven states are weak Dillon’s Rule states. Lastly, fifteen states are 
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strong Dillon’s Rule states. As for municipalities, seventeen states are strong home rule 
states. Eight states are weak home rule states. Thirteen states are weak Dillon’s Rule states. 
Lastly, eleven states are strong Dillon’s Rule states. The higher the score a state has, the 
greater home rule power the localities have. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present the distribution of 
home rule power index at the state level, as of 2015, for city and county governments, 
respectively. Those two figures imply regional differences that Midwestern and southern 




Source: Turnbull and Geon (2006); Krane et al. (2001). Note: The higher score of home rule index, 
the greater autonomy a local government has. 




Source: Turnbull and Geon (2006); Krane et al. (2001). Note: The higher score of home rule index, 
the greater autonomy a local government has. 
Figure 2.2 Home Rule for Municipalities by State 
 
Debt Limitations 
Definition and Categories of Debt Limitations 
Local government debt has played an important role in financing infrastructure and 
providing public services. The fiscal mismanagement of municipal bonds and debt 
practices in the first half of the 1800s led to the birth of Dillon’s Rule. “Judge Dillon 
thought that placing local governments under state legislative control would end the fiscal 
mismanagement that plagued many municipalities in that day” (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 
2001, p.474). Following this, states put constraints on local government borrowings to 
protect the solvency of local governments and to protect bondholders.  
The first broad type of constraints is debt limitations (Rose 2010). A debt limit 
refers to the maximum amount of debt that a government can borrow. In general, debt limits 
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take one of two forms. One form of the debt limit is the debt ceiling, a state-imposed ceiling 
on local debt as a percent of a certain tax base of the local government or a specific debt 
amount of dollars. The other form is the referendum requirement that bond issues must be 
passed by referendum. Since getting voter approval is generally more difficult to obtain 
than the approval of the government, a referendum requirement is an implicit restriction on 
debt issues (Pogue 1970). Ross (2010) proposes a four-type category for debt limit, in 
which debt limit not only includes the debt ceiling and referendum requirement but also 
outright prohibition and legislative supermajority requirement for increasing debt. The 
latter two types of debt limit, however, are uncommon in local debt limits. 
The imposition of debt limits on local debt restricts local governments’ decision-
making power and thereby limits the extent to which they can respond to the preferences 
of citizens. Falling under the umbrella of fiscal federalism, the traditional theory includes 
the assignment of functions to different levels of government. Assuming government as a 
benevolent agent, decentralization is considered good governance since the devolution of 
tax and expenditure authority produces greater efficiency in public good provision (Oates 
et al., 1972; Olson, 1969). Hence, a higher level of local autonomy is expected to help 
localities provide service efficiently and respect residents better. 
  
Debt Limitations in the States 
Unlike home rule, which focuses on general purpose governments, all types of local 
governments face debt limitations from the state government, although states are different 
19 
 
in the specific limitations on various types of local governments. As of 2015, 23 states have 
both debt ceiling and referendum requirements for their municipality, county, and school 
district governments. In the meantime, only Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, and Tennessee 
do not impose any debt limitations on their local governments. The rest of the states at least 
imposes one form of debt limitation on a type of local government. Table 2.2 summarizes 
the debt limitations for those three types of localities in states.  
Debt limitations have been fairly stable in the past three decades. Only eight states 
slightly revised debt limitations during that period.2 In particular, Maryland, Oregon, 
Texas, California and New Hampshire changed their debt ceiling requirement for localities, 
while Iowa, Kentucky, and Rhode Island added referendum requirements on local 
borrowing. 
 






















CT, HI, MD, TN N N N N N N 
VT Y N N N N N 
AL N Y N Y N N 
IN Y Y N N N N 
MA Y N N N N Y 
OR N Y N N Y Y 
DE, KY, OK,  Y Y N N N N 
 
2 Maryland in 2013, Oregon in 2007; Texas in 2001; California in 1998; and New Hampshire in 1998. 
Referendum requirement: Rhode Island in 2007; and Kentucky, Iowa in 1995. 
20 
 
Table 2.2 (continued)    
FL, PA N Y N Y N Y 
RI Y Y N N N Y 
CO, ID N Y N Y Y Y 
ME Y Y N N Y Y 
NJ Y N Y N Y Y 
VA Y Y N Y N Y 
AR, GA, KS, TX,  Y Y Y Y N Y 
AK Y Y Y Y Y N 
MI Y Y Y N Y Y 
NM Y Y N Y Y Y 
AZ, CA, IL, IO, LA, MN, MS MO, 
MT, NB, NV, NH, NY, NC, ND, OH, 
SC, SD, UT, WA, WV, WI, WY. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Source: Goodman (2018), Krane et al. (2001) 
Note: Hawaii has no municipal governments, only county governments. Connecticut, Rhode Island and 
Vermont have no county government. 
 
Among those states that employ the debt ceiling on localities, there is a large 
amount of variation in the stringency of local borrowing. For example, Mississippi imposes 
a 15%-assessed-valuation debt ceiling on all types of its local governments, but Arizona’s 
debt ceiling for all its local governments is about 6%. Meanwhile, states may treat different 
types of local governments variously. Kentucky is a good example to illustrate that. While 
Kentucky counties and school districts face a 2% debt ceiling as of assessed valuation, 
cities in Kentucky face a loose debt ceiling. The lowest debt ceiling for a Kentucky city is 
at 3%. Moreover, even cities in Kentucky are under different degrees of the debt ceiling. 
Kentucky employs a tiered debt limit based on the population of a city. Cities having a 
population of fifteen thousand or more cannot borrow more than 10% of its assessed value; 
cities having a population of less than fifteen thousand but not less than three thousand face 
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a 5% debt ceiling; and, the debt ceiling for cities having a population of less than three 
thousand is 3%.  
States’ debt ceilings on localities also are different by the type of locality. There is 
a large amount of variation for debt a school district can borrow as the percentage of its 
assessed valuation, from Montana at 50% to Ohio at less than 1%. Six states have no debt 
limitations on school districts, higher than the number of states that do not impose debt 
limitations on municipalities or counties.    
Despite the discussion of differences between the states in terms of debt ceilings, 
the distribution of differences between government types are equally important to consider. 
Figures 2.3 to 2.5 further present the different debt ceiling for state debt limitation on three 
types of local governments. The lower debt ceiling a state sets, the more stringent it is 
toward local debt incurred. In general, we can see that municipalities and counties share a 
similar distribution pattern. Southern states restrict debts of municipalities and counties 
less. The distributional pattern of school district, however, is different from the other two 
types of local governments. Southern states seem to highly control the debt of school 






Note: Debt ceiling as the percentage of assessed value. A lower debt ceiling represents a stringent 
debt control. 
Figure 2.3 Debt Ceiling on Municipality by State 
 
 
Note: Debt ceiling as the percentage of assessed value. A lower debt ceiling represents a stringent 
debt control. 





Note: Debt ceiling as the percentage of assessed value. A lower debt ceiling represents a stringent 
debt control. 
Figure 2.5 Debt Ceiling on School Districts by State 
 
Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
Categories of Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
To limit the “oversized” local governments and increase local efficiency, states put 
several limitations on local governments’ tax and expenditure policies. The development 
of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) is relatively late compared to home rule and debt 
limitations. Though some states have TELs on local property taxes in the early 20th century, 
the adoption of state and local government tax and expenditure limitations accelerated after 
California’s Proposition 13 in 1978. Forty-six states and thirty-one states have some form 
of TELs on the local government and state government, respectively, by 2001 (Mullins and 
Wallin 2004).  
According to Joyce and Mullins (1991) and the Advisory Commission on 
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Intergovernmental Relations (1989), TELs can be categorized into seven basic forms: 
overall property tax rate limits, specific property tax rate limits, property tax levy limits, 
general revenue limits, general expenditure limits, limits on assessment increases, and full 
disclosure and truth-in-taxation measure. Five of those seven categories are directly or 
indirectly related to property taxes, which indicates one objective of TELs: to prevent local 
governments from relying heavily on property taxes. The other two types of TELs cap the 
overall size of the local budget. 
Up until 2015, only Connecticut, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Vermont 
have no type of TELs. In contrast, other states have at least one of those types of TELs. 
Interestingly, no state has all seven types of TEL, and only Colorado and California have 
adopted six types of TEL. Among those states with at least one type of TELs, most of them 
have property tax levy limits, but only a few of them impose either general revenue limits 
or general expenditure limits on local governments. 
The stringency of the limitation depends on the types adopted and their 
characteristics (Joyce and Mullins 1991). Some of these limits are more formidable 
constraints while others are more flexible or easy to circumvent. For example, general-
purpose local governments in New York State can legislatively override TELs with a 60 
percent vote of the local governing board (Aldag, Warner, and Kim 2018), which is a 




Due to the complexity of TELs, a comprehensive measure for the overall stringency 
of TELs is intuitive to show how states vary their limits on local revenues and expenditures. 
Some studies have, constructed stringency measures of the limitation based on the types 
adopted and their characteristics. Wen et al. (2018) create a severity index for 50 states 
building on the work of Joyce and Mullins (1991). They introduce TELs’ characteristics, 
such as magnitude, exclusions, and override provisions, to differentiate the stringency of 
the types of TELs. The next section adopts the index of Wen et al. (2018) to show how 
states vary TELs.  
 
State TEL severity index by government type 
Having the basic category of TELs in mind, this section intends to introduce states’ 
choice of TELs. To get an initial sense of local tax and expenditure limitations patterns 
among the states, Figures 2.6 to 2.8 present the Wen et al. (2018)’s TELs severity index in 
2015 for counties, municipalities, and school districts, respectively. The higher the score a 
state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and expenditures. There 
is a large amount of variation in the restrictiveness of state constraints on local taxes and 
expenditures, from Colorado that scores 36 in the index to Connecticut that has no 
limitation on localities. 
We can see a regional difference from those three figures. Southwestern states tend 
to have the most stringent TELs on all three types of local governments; northeastern and 
southeastern states have relatively easy TELs; western and midwestern states are moderate 
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in using stringent TELs. 
States also are different in their choice of TELs on diverse types of local 
governments. Counties and municipalities seem to share a similar degree of limitations on 
taxes and expenditures in most states. School districts, however, are more likely to 
experience a little bit higher freedom in controlling their own revenues and expenditures. 
For example, Washington and Idaho have a substantially lower constraint on school 
districts’ taxes, probably because school districts usually heavily rely on property taxes 
which is the main target of TELs. While most states put a similar level of TELs on their 
different types of local government, Alaska, Delaware, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have 
no limitations on county and school district governments but a moderate level of constraints 
on municipality governments. 
 
 
Note: The higher the score a state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and 
expenditures. 





Note: The higher the score a state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and 
expenditures. 
Figure 2.7 TELs on Counties by State 
 
 
Note: The higher the score a state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and 
expenditures. 
 




To better understand the structure of TELs on different types of local governments, 
this section divides above seven categories of TELs into two broad types of TEL: property 
related TEL and overall budget TEL. Figures 2.9 to 2.11 present the TELs severity index 
across states by local government type. Most states adopt some property taxes related TELs. 
The regional differences in property taxes related TELs are similar to the overall 
TELs. In particular, southwestern states tend to have the most stringent property tax related 
TELs, northeastern and southeastern states have relatively loose property taxes related 
TELs. It is important to note that the variation of stringency among three types of local 
governments is larger in property taxes related TELs. While the average score of overall 
TELs index is similar across three types of local governments, municipalities have a 
significantly higher level of severity level for property taxes related TELs. Counties tend 





Note: The higher the score a state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and 
expenditures. 
Figure 2.9 Property Related TELs on Municipalities by State 
 
 
Note: The higher the score a state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and 
expenditures. 





Note: The higher the score a state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and 
expenditures. 
Figure 2.11 Property Related TELs on School Districts by State 
 
Unlike property taxes related TELs that are widely adopted by states, only nine 
states impose overall budget TELs on their local governments. As of 2015, at least one of 
the overall budget TELs are found in Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, New Jersey, 
Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Consistent with the overall TELs distribution, 
southwestern and midwestern states are more likely to adopt a stringent limitation. 
Counties and municipalities have the same distribution with overall budget TELs. 
In particular, Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, and New Jersey adopt overall budget 
TELs for both county and municipality governments. Meanwhile, those five states also put 
overall budget TELs on school districts. On the other hand, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
and Wisconsin only put overall budget TELs for school districts but not for county or 
municipality governments. Those four states do not have stringent property taxes related 
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TELs for their school districts compared to other states in the region. They seem to prefer 
using overall budget TELs to limit their school districts’ fiscal management. In sum, states 
tend to put more constraints on school districts’ total size of budget appropriations. 
 
 
Note: The higher the score a state gets, the more restrictive a state-imposed limit on local taxes and 
expenditures. 
Figure 2.12 Overall Budget TELs on Municipalities and Counties by State 
 
 




Figure 2.13 Overall Budget TELs on School Districts by State 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review for studying state-imposed fiscal institutions in 
the American states. A comparison of how three institutions are used to control local 
governments by the state provides a clearer picture of how states consider the state-local 
relationship. States are diverse when it comes to putting constraints on local autonomy 
regarding debts, taxes, and expenditures. The state-imposed institutions also vary with the 
size and type of local governments. For instance, while there are more constraints on 
municipalities than county or special district governments, some studies have linked the 
growth of special districts to circumvent the constraints of states including debt limitation 
and TELs (Yu 2018). It is possible that states consider special districts do not need more 
constraints because they have better fiscal discipline than the general-purpose governments. 








CHAPTER THREE: HOME RULE AND LOCAL REVENUES 
Introduction 
Local governments are creatures of the states. The power and authority they possess 
are determined by state constitution, statutes, court rulings, and practices. Traditionally, 
local governments may exercise only those powers expressly granted by the state under 
Dillon’s Rule which derived from two court decisions issued by Judge John F. Dillon of 
Iowa in 1868 (Richard et al. 2003; Richardson 2011). In effect, state governments can place 
whatever restrictions they choose on their local governments, if such restrictions do not 
violate the state's constitution (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001). Practically, states often place 
constraints on local governments regarding the types of activities or things that can be taxed, 
the rates they can institute, as well as mandate or limit their expenditures and debt authority 
(Denison, Hackbart, Moody 2006; Mullins and Pagano 2005; Maher et al. 2016). 
The strongest argument for more local authority lies in the recognition that the 
preferences of residents are heterogeneous across localities. To be able to respond to the 
preferences of their own residents, local governments desire at least some degree of local 
autonomy. Home rule is a legal device through which states have provided more local 
autonomy. Among 40 home rule states, 8 states do not apply home rule to a certain size of 
small municipalities (Russell and Bostrom 2016). Municipalities differ in size, in 
governing structure, in amenities, in tax base, in citizen ideology, and on many other 
dimensions (Bell and Jayne 2009; Siegel and Waxman 2001). With these many differences, 
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it is reasonable to expect that the effect of home rule would not be the same across all 
municipalities. The flexibility provided by home rule may be critical for small 
municipalities which have been particularly struggling to maintain services level because 
of declining population and inadequate management limit the ability to obtain and manage 
resources (Hall 2008; Mohr, Deller, and Halstead 2010; Simonsen, Robbins and Helgerson 
2001).  
More previous studies have examined large municipalities only. This study 
contributes to the state-local division of power debate by focusing on the effect of home 
rule on small municipalities through exploring the effects of a constitutional home rule on 
local revenues. The empirical evidence presented concerns Illinois home rule, which gives 
municipalities more discretion in making a wide range of policies that have not been 
addressed by the state, including the power to adjust tax rates and establish new taxes 
(Banovetz 2002; Krane, Rigos, and Hill, 2001). This article attempts to provide causal 
evidence by conducting a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design that compares Illinois 
home rule municipalities with non-home rule municipalities around the population 
threshold for automatically adopting home rule. This method provides causal evidence by 
addressing endogeneity bias that might stem from unobservable confounders and selection 
biases that may affect which municipalities choose home rule. 
In particular, this article estimates the effects of Illinois home rule on the level of 
own-source revenues, revenue stability, and revenue structure, respectively. The results of 
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the RD estimation show that home rule significantly and largely increases own-source 
revenues and significantly diversifies revenue structure for small municipalities. The 
preferred specification suggests that the adoption of home rule increases total own-source 
revenues about 300 percent and diversifies local revenue structure by about 50 percent. 
Furthermore, those increased revenues are largely due to local sales taxes and other taxes; 
property taxes and nontax revenues do not experience a significant change. Meanwhile, 
home rule has little influence on revenue volatility, implying that small municipalities do 
not stabilize revenues through home rule. These results remain similar across sets of 
robustness checks. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: first section reviews the 
literature on home rule and links that with local revenue. Second section introduces the 
characteristics of small municipalities and elaborates on how the smallness of the 
municipality influences home rule implementation. Next, the institutional setting for 
Illinois home rule, the methodology, and data are introduced. The next section reports the 
empirical findings. Lastly, this article ends with a discussion of the research findings and 
policy implications. 
 
Home Rule and Local Revenue 
Home Rule as the Expansion of Local Autonomy 
Throughout the twentieth century, local governments obtained some degree of local 
autonomy through home rule. Home rule, in general, is defined as “the ability of a local 
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government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been designated to be of 
statewide interest through general law, state constitutional provisions, or initiatives and 
referenda” (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001, 2). The goal of home rule is to give municipalities 
more discretion in making policies, solving problems to improve local public goods and 
service provision, and protecting local governments from interference by the state 
government. 
Although state governments are not directly involved in the operations of local 
governments, even under Dillon’s Rule, home rule municipalities have more discretion and 
flexibility in making policies. A home rule municipality may exercise its power by passing 
ordinances regarding local affairs. As long as home rule ordinance enactments have both 
been found to fit within the scope of transferred power and nevertheless been preempted 
by state law, a home rule municipality may manage local affairs without oversight from 
the state legislature (Richardson et al. 2003). For instance, the Council of Downers Grove, 
Illinois, proposed a tax ordinance after it obtained its home rule status. After allowing 
citizens enough time to submit an opposing petition, the Council adopted such ordinance 
when no opposing petition was submitted (Diamond and Krafthefer 2014). 
Since Missouri first adopted home rule in 1875, 40 states have adopted home rule 
(Russell and Bostrom 2016). Home rule takes various forms and contains different scopes 
of power among those states. It can be categorized into two types. The first type of home 
rule usually granted powers from their charter; therefore, such home rule states required a 
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municipality should exercise those powers explicitly granted in the charter. Some scholars 
view charter home rule as a constitutional contract between the citizens and local managers 
over the operation of government. From this perspective, home rule not only enhances local 
responsiveness and efficiency but also fosters coordination by reducing the uncertainty of 
policies (Maser 1985, 1998; McDonald and Gabrini 2014). 
This study focusses on the other type of home rule, that is, home rule granted 
directly by the state constitution. It does not depend on the home rule charter adoption 
(Weeks and Hardy, 1984), which gives home rule units a substantial self-governance power. 
Scholars generally view home rule as the expansion of local autonomy and the 
decentralization of decision-making power from the state to local governments (Turnbull 
and Geon 2006; Wood 2011). One normative argument for decentralization is that local 
governments are closer to the people and better reflect individual preferences. Also, 
competition among communities should lead to greater economic efficiency and 
innovation (Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956). Decentralization provides strong fiscal incentives 
and the incentives of reelection for promoting political accountability (Bardhan 2002; Jin, 
Qian, and Weingast 2005). The opponents of home rule, on the other hand, argue that state 
government control ensures greater uniformity of goods and services provision and states 
possess more technical expertise and professional capacity (Richardson, Gough, and 
Puentes 2003). The idea, nevertheless, that home rule is expected to help municipalities 





Home Rule and Local Revenue 
One responsibility of local government is to raise revenue to pay for services 
demanded by residents. Although a concern about home rule is that municipalities may 
abuse their power of levying taxes, the traditional idea of fiscal federalism and 
decentralization holds that the competition among local governments constrains 
municipalities’ tendency of revenue-maximizing (Epple and Zelenitz 1981; Oates 1985; 
Zax 1989). Empirically, a few empirical studies have looked at the impacts of home rule 
on local revenues in large municipalities. Most of them find either an insignificant or a 
negative effect of home rule on the level of local revenues (Dye and McGuire 1997; 
Hendrick 2002; Wood 2011). Hence, home rule units are expected to improve economic 
efficiency without increasing local taxes. 
More fiscal autonomy does not only mean more power of policy-making but also 
means more responsibility. An “ideal” local revenue not only needs to be adequate to meet 
local needs or be fair to taxpayers, but it also should be stable and predictable over time 
(Bird 1993; Gramlich 1993). If a government becomes fiscally unstable, it must either 
increase the taxes or reduce the service provision, both of which may lead the residents to 
vote with their feet (Epple and Zelenitz 1981; Tiebout 1956; McDonald 2015). Hence, a 
responsible home rule municipality would stabilize its local revenue. 
Home rule could stabilize local revenues by expanding the range of tax base options 
39 
 
available to municipalities, which increases municipalities’ fiscal policy space and the 
ability to address financial problems (Hendrick and Crawford 2014). Fiscal policy space 
refers to the set of parameters within which municipality officials operate, decide, and 
create a fiscal policy (Pagano and Hoene 2010), and it includes the range of options for a 
local government for solving its financial problems (Hendrick and Crawford 2014). With 
the flexibility of home rule, municipalities have more tools such as establishing new taxes 
to cover revenue shortfall, instead of relying on managing public funds or transfers from 
the state. 
Recently, studies have found evidence that the local autonomy and fiscal policy 
space brought by home rule tends to enhance local financial stability and fiscal health. 
Hendrick and Crawford (2014) focus on municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan region 
and find that home rule units tend to have lower volatility in government operational 
spending. Consistently, Shoag, Tuttle, and Veuger (2017) compare home rule 
municipalities to non-home-rule municipalities in addressing the extreme loss of revenues 
caused by the bankruptcy of big-box retail chains. They find that municipalities with home 
rule status experience smaller declines in own-source revenue after the bankruptcy of retail 
chains. McDonald (2015) also finds evidence in Florida counties that the status of charter 
home rule is associated with better local fiscal health. 
 
Home Rule in Small Municipalities 
To date, most studies have focused on large municipalities when examining the 
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effects of home rule. Small municipalities face challenges different from those of large 
municipalities by the very fact of their size.1 Maintaining revenue sufficiency and 
balancing the budget are often more challenging for small municipalities. The economy of 
small municipalities highly relies on place-specific resource advantages, such as the 
development of a few industries, land, and minerals. That makes small municipalities more 
vulnerable to economic downturns or revenue shortfalls compared with large 
municipalities (Carroll and Johnson 2010; Yan 2011). Consequently, small municipalities 
tend to strictly follow balanced budget requirements due to the uncertainty of future 
revenues and strict auditing by the state (Dougherty et al. 2003). 
Small scale means that the small municipalities lack a strong, diverse economic 
base, resulting in a shortage of fiscal resources (Siegel and Waxman 2001). That lack of 
fiscal resources further becomes a barrier for small municipalities to access outside 
resources such as federal grants, municipal bond, intermunicipal cooperation, and 
outsourcing contracts (Hall 2008; Mohr, Deller, and Halstead 2010; Simonsen, Robbins 
and Helgerson 2001). As a result, small municipalities are more dependent on their own-
source revenues to supply public services. Buettner and Wildasin (2006) show that, in 
response to innovation in expenditures, about 18% of a permanent increase in spending is 
financed by increased grants for small municipalities, whereas the corresponding figure for 
large municipalities is almost 49%. Therefore, small municipalities may be motivated to 
raise own-source revenues relative to large municipalities. As a result, small municipalities 
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with home rule status may be likely to collect more revenues. 
With fewer fiscal resources, it becomes difficult to attract outside managerial 
professionals who are necessary to promote innovative policy making and conduct 
financial management. In small municipalities, professional staffs are frequently small or 
even nonexistent. In some cases, the only paid professional could be either the municipality 
manager or the planner (Matterson 1996). Even if small municipalities are willing to attract 
professionals without considering fiscal resources, they have to face that small 
municipalities lack the “growth-facilitating amenities” attractive to young professionals, 
compared to big municipalities. Although older professionals may see small municipalities 
as a nice place to raise their families, they, however, may not be as entrepreneurial as the 
younger population (Erickcek and McKinney 2006). 
Because of the lack of professionals and resources, small municipalities’ idea of 
financial management may be a simple task of controlling expenditures. As Gargan says, 
“In small municipalities, financial management is primarily budgeting; and budgeting is 
not viewed in terms of long-range planning and resource allocations but simply as a 
mechanism for control of expenditures” (Gargan 1981, 652). Consequently, small 
municipalities lack the critical mass of resources to allocate to sophisticated problem 
analysis or strategic planning activities. 
With the abovementioned characteristics for small municipalities, concerns of 
adopting home rule in small municipalities should be whether anyone can make use of their 
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autonomy to improve fiscal performance activities such as stabilizing the budget. This 
study is particularly interested in exploring the effects of home rule on small municipalities. 
By focusing on small municipalities in Illinois, we will examine whether home rule plays 
an essential role in small municipalities’ revenues. 
 
Illinois Home Rule Setting 
Illinois is a Dillon’s rule state, meaning cities, towns, counties, and other types of 
municipalities are the “creature of the state.” Under Dillion’s rule, municipalities can only 
exercise powers explicitly granted to them by the state. Municipalities, however, especially 
those located in the Chicago metropolitan area and Cook County, had been striving to gain 
more local autonomy. Their efforts finally succeeded when voters approved the Illinois 
Constitutional Amendments in 1970 and 1995 that provided Illinois municipalities with an 
optional home rule system (Banovetz 2002). 
Although home rule came late to Illinois, it is viewed as “one of most liberal found 
in any state constitution” and “the most advanced form as far as a flexible governing system” 
(Wandling 2001, 128). The 1970 Illinois Constitution grants broad home rule powers. 
Home rule units possess powers so long as they are not prohibited by state or federal law. 
As Krane, Rigos, and Hills (2001) summarizes “...the Illinois Constitution set forth 
complex decision rules related to the establishment of home rule; the writing and adoption 
of charter; the specific areas of local affairs... and powers to tax and incur debt... By contrast, 
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non-home rule units and limited-purpose governments (such as special districts, township) 
shall have only powers granted by law.”  
The broad scope of that home rule power extends to local discretion in making 
fiscal policy. While non-home rule units neither adjust tax rates nor establish new taxes 
unless authorized by state legislation, home rule units are not only capable of changing tax 
rates within a specific range but also are given wide discretion to design new revenues, 
including revenues not authorized in the statutes. Most importantly, home rule units can 
use that power without a referendum or legislative authorization, while non-home rule units 
need legislative approvals to change tax rates. In addition, home rule municipalities are 
free from tax and expenditure limitations which cap the size and tax rates of property tax 
for local governments, giving home rule units room for managing their most important 
revenue source. 
To prevent home rule units from abusing their power of levying taxes, Illinois put 
constraints on some aspects of home rule. First, they prohibited municipalities from taxing 
income earnings unless authorized by the state. Second, although home rule units are 
permitted to levy a “supplemental home rule” sales taxes in 0.25 increments, the State’s 
Department of Revenue takes charge of collecting and distributing these “home rule” sale 
taxes. Finally, the General Assembly imposed a referendum requirement on the levy of the 
real estate transfer tax by home rule units. 
Although home rule seems desirable to local administrators, only municipalities 
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and counties can adopt home rule. In Illinois, the scope of the municipality includes city, 
village, and incorporated town only.2 The Illinois Constitution provides two ways to adopt 
home rule for municipalities. First, municipalities of more than 25,000 residents 
automatically become a home rule unit unless a majority of residents vote to drop it, which 
ensures that all large municipalities will possess more autonomy. More importantly, 
municipalities with less than 25,000 residents can adopt home rule by referendum. While 
home rule units may vary in the way they adopt home rule, the powers the Constitution 
grants them are identical. On all stated above, a home rule unit can abolish home rule by 
referendum as well. More than thirty referendums have been held to decide whether or not 
a municipality’s existing home rule system should be retained, but only five municipalities 
eventually passed such retention referendum and abolished home rule. In 2012, Westmont 
Village became the first Illinois municipality to repeal the home rule status in 29 years 
since voters approved a referendum that stripped Rockford of home rule in 1983. 
In 2012, 204 municipalities, out of 1200 municipalities, had become a home rule 
unit in Illinois. In particular, 77 of 204 municipalities automatically adopted home rule by 
the population rule, and 127 municipalities adopted home rule by referendum. Most 
municipalities that adopted home rule after the 1980s were through the referendum. 
Although only about 17 percent of Illinois municipalities adopt home rule, over half of the 
state’s residents live in home rule units (Banovetz 2002). 
Illinois home rule is well suited for this study for several reasons. First, Illinois has 
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a large number of municipalities that are diverse in terms of economy and culture. Second, 
unlike some states where the scope of home rule power varies by the charter of each 
municipality, all Illinois home rule municipalities share identical home rule powers. In 
addition, Illinois home rule is constitutional law providing an intense treatment and allows 
us to capture the causal effects of home rule from the underlying time trend. More 
importantly, Illinois’s home rule setting offers an opportunity to conduct quasi-
experimental research to produce causal evidence through the exogenous changes of home 
rule status at the population threshold. 
 
Research Design and Data 
To date, most research has adopted a panel or cross-section analysis not only cannot 
offer proper counterfactuals to home rule municipalities but also may fail to address the 
endogeneity problem. Home rule, as a constitutional contract, has been shown to reflect 
local governmental political, demographic, and economic characteristics (Maser 1985, 
1999; McDonald and Gabrini 2014). While previous studies attempt to account for those 
influences by controlling observable variables, the adoption of home rule may be 
associated with those and other unobserved variables. Many previous home rule studies 
look at states where municipalities could adopt home rule through a referendum. The 





Empirical Strategy  
This study conducts a fuzzy regression discontinuity design with the threshold 
coming from the home rule population rule in 2002, 2007, 2010, and 2012. Regression 
discontinuity design is an identification strategy in observational studies. It can address the 
problems of the previous estimations of home rule effects and identify a causal effect rather 
than correlation. In this design, treatment is assigned based on whether candidates’ value 
for a numeric running variable falls above or below a certain threshold or cutoff. For 
example, assignment to home rule status in Illinois is determined by a municipality’s 
population. Focusing on the observations near the cutoff, scholars conduct causal inference 
by taking advantage of an exogenously assigned treatment at a given cutoff. In other words, 
the rationale of the design is that observations just below the cutoff are useful comparisons 
to those just above the cutoff (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Since this article focuses on 
local revenues, the result of the RD design can be interpreted as the local average treatment 
effect of home rule status on local finance for municipalities near the population cutoff, 
which may not be generalized to municipalities far away from the cutoff.  
This article uses the municipality’s population as the running variable and the 
25,000-population threshold of home rule adoption in Illinois as the cutoff. RD design 
based on population threshold has been popular recently. Even though some problems exist, 
“population-threshold RDD may be the best available research design for studying the 
effects of certain policies and political institutions” (Egger et al., 2018, p210). 
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Since there are two ways to become a home rule unit for a municipality in Illinois, 
either automatically on the basis of population or by referendum, treatment assignment still 
depends on the population but in such a way that the probability of adopting home rule has 
a relevant discontinuity at the home rule population threshold. This institutional setup 
offers a treatment assignment mechanism typical of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design 
which treatment is not fully determined by whether the population crosses the threshold 
(Lee and Lemieux 2010). Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the probability a municipality is a 
home rule unit jumps dramatically at the population cutoff of 25,000. This article, therefore, 
sets up a binary variable indicating whether a municipality is above the 25,000-population 
cutoff as the instrument for municipalities’ actual home rule status. 
Specifically, the estimation of the first stage regression on the municipality near the 
cutoff is as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒25000𝑖𝑡) + β2(Population𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽3(𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒25000𝑖𝑡 ∗ Population𝑖𝑡) + 𝑔(𝑃) + 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + ϵ𝑖𝑡 
 
where Above25000it is a binary variable that equals 1 if a municipality has more 
than 25,000 residents; population is the running variable that assigns the treatment, HRit is 
a binary variable corresponding to 1 if the municipality i is a home rule unit in year t and 
0 otherwise. A quadratic polynomial in the running variable population, g (P), is included 
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to control the unobserved differences between home rule and non-home rule municipalities, 
following the suggestion of Gelman and Imbens (2018). The second stage produces an 
estimation of the causal effect of home rule on outcome variables, as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡) + β2(Population𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ Population𝑖𝑡) + 𝑔(𝑃) + 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿
+ ϵ𝑖𝑡 
 
where Yit is the variable of interest for municipality i in year t, 𝛿 is the year fixed 
effect, and ϵ is the error term. The coefficient β1 is the policy variable of interest, which 
represents the estimated local average treatment effects of home rule.3 Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. As in a randomized 
experiment, in an RD design consistent estimates of the treatment effects can be obtained 
without including covariates in the estimations. However, the same population threshold 
may be used to determine multiple policies, which makes it difficult to interpret the results 
of estimation. The model adds the vector of covariate Zit to address that potential compound 
effects, following Eggers et al. (2018). As we will see in the next section, whether a 
municipality hires a professional manager or administrator is the only potential compound 
effect that was found. Hence, Zit only contains a binary variable which equals one when a 
municipality hires a professional manager or administrator. 
In the estimation, a key decision is the choice of bandwidth which limits the 
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analysis to observations that lie within the close vicinity of the discontinuity. Large 
bandwidths generate more precision with a larger number of observations but create more 
bias, vice versa (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Following Shoag et al. (2019), this paper 
estimates the model using different population bandwidths: 12,500, 15,000, and 20,000, to 
show the robustness of the results to the different choice of bandwidth. 
 
Note: This graph plots the distribution of municipalities’ population in Illinois. The running variable is 
the distance of municipality’s population from home rule threshold. 
Figure 3.14 Probability of Home Rule Adoption by Population 
 
Validity of the RD Design 
The validity of the RD design lies in the assumption that the assignment of 
treatments is “as good as random” near the cutoff. The primary concern in this context is 
that a municipality can manipulate its home rule status by manipulating the population or 
holding referendums frequently in order to fall on the desired side of the population 
threshold, which was found in some RD research based on population thresholds (Eggers 
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et al., 2018). Fortunately, the Illinois home rule setting reduces the probability of the 
manipulation problem. The automatic adoption of home rule is based on the population 
reported by the national census instead of the municipalities’ self-reported population. 
Therefore, municipalities cannot directly manipulate the population to affect the home rule 
status. While municipalities can acquire home rule through a referendum, only 97 
referendums, out of 191, passed between 1970 and 2000, suggesting that the manipulation 
problem should be less severe in Illinois. More importantly, if the referendum fails, a new 
vote may not be taken for 23 months, preventing local officials from strategically holding 
referendum. 
To be more cautious, we adopt two solutions to address the manipulation problem. 
First, the sample period concentrates on census years. The 2002, 2007 and 2010 Census of 
Governments, and the 2010 U.S. Census as the years of population count for the adoption 
of home rule. Second, the maximum population before 2002 replaces the population in 
2002, following Shoag et al. (2017). Although a municipality becomes a home rule unit 
once it reaches the population threshold, it does not lose home rule when the population 
decreases below that threshold unless residents vote to abolish it. This can tackle the threats 
to the validity of the fuzzy instrument caused by the changing of local demography. 
After making these two adjustments, this section conducts two tests—a McCrary’s 
density test and a balance test of background variables to formally test the validity of the 
RD design. McCrary’s density test examines the distribution of treatments on the running 
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variable to check the randomness of the treatment (McCrary 2008). If home rule is 
randomly assigned, the distribution of treatments should be smooth around the population 
threshold. Figure 3.2 shows no significant signs of a jump of the density of municipalities 
near the cutoff, suggesting municipalities do not manipulate home rule adoption. The test 
statistic is about -0.30, with a standard deviation of 0.25, which is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Notes: The x-axis represents municipalities’ population in Illinois; the y-axis represents density. The test 
statistic is about -0.30, with a standard deviation of 0.25, suggesting no evidence of manipulation for 
home rule assignment. 
Figure 15 McCrary Test of Change in Density at Home Rule Population Threshold 
 
Then, we proceed to test the balance of the background variables. If the assumption 
of randomly assigned home rule is valid, the observed characteristics of subjects in the 
home rule units and non-home rule units should not be significantly different, suggesting 
the balance of unobserved characteristics. The balance test compares fiscal and 
demographic characteristics of municipalities near the population threshold by using 
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pairwise comparisons. It examines municipalities with population ranged from 15,000 to 
40,000, which includes all municipalities in the largest bandwidth.  
Table 3.1 shows the results of the balance tests of background variables for the 
sample. The results of the balance test show that background variables are not significantly 
different except the municipality’s managerial form. The municipality’s managerial form 
refers to whether a municipality hires a professional manager/administrator, which has 
been shown to affect local revenues (Wei, Butler, and Jennings 2019). To address the 
potential effect, the model adds a covariate, government’s managerial form, to the model, 
following Eggers et al. (2018). 
 































































Table 3.1 (continued) 
Equalized Assessed 









Notes: Government managerial form is a binary variable which equals one when a municipality hires a 
professional manager or administrator. Ideology is measured by the vote share of Democratic 
presidential candidates got for the closest presential election in the county that each municipality locates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Data and Measure for Outcomes 
As stated earlier, this article focuses on Illinois small municipalities with population 
ranged from 15,000 to 40,000 in 2002, 2007, 2010, and 2012. There were 187 
municipalities that fell under this range during the sample period. Illinois home rule data 
come from the Illinois Secretary of State, which reports the year and the way home rule 
units adopted home rule. Government finance data are from Annual Financial Dataset of 
the State of Illinois Comptroller. Government form data come from the Illinois City/County 
Management Association, which lists local governments that take a managerial 
government form and reports the year they adopted it. Ideology data come from 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s (2013) county-level presidential election result. 
This study has three tests of outcomes of interest: local own-source revenues, 
revenue structure, and revenue stability. Local own-source revenues reflect the 
independence of a local government’s fiscal choices. We first focus on total own-source 
revenues; then, we examine the differential impact of home rule on each revenue source. 
In particular, this study follows Carroll and Johnson’s (2010) method that divides the total 
own-source revenue into four categories–property taxes, general sales taxes, other taxes, 
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and other non-tax revenues. Other taxes refer to taxes imposed on selected goods and 
services, such as utilities tax and alcohol tax. Nontax revenues include miscellaneous 
revenues and charges. The second outcome is revenue structure which reflects the 
amalgamation of local fiscal policy for raising revenues to fund government operating 
(Bartle, Kriz, and Morozov 2011). We use a reserved Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
to measure the extent to which home rule diversifies revenue structures.4  
The final outcome variable of interest is revenue stability for which we use revenue 
volatility as the measure. Specifically, total revenue volatility is calculated as the absolute 
deviation of the residuals divided by the predicted values, following Carroll and Stater’s 
(2009) method. This measure of total revenue volatility can account both for the variation 
in size among municipalities and for the time trend. The greater the values of this variable, 
the greater total revenue volatility is. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of the 
variables. 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
      
Home Rule Status 527 0.482 0.500 0 1 
Revenue Diversification 
 (HHI Index) 
527 0.787 0.132 0 0.999 
Total Own-source Revenue (log) 527 15.68 0.841 11.91 17.29 
Property Tax (log) 527 14.22 2.661 0 16.60 
Local Sales Tax (log) 527 4.616 6.720 0 16.83 
Other Taxes (log) 527 12.49 4.370 0 16.09 
Nontax Revenues (log) 527 14.59 0.793 10.96 16.38 
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Table 3.2 (continued)   
Total Revenue Volatility (log) 527 -5.468 1.183 -10.82 -2.783 
The UV Index (log) 527 -3.980 1.115 -7.217 0.565 
Year-to-year Volatility (log) 527 13.09 1.372 5.047 16.18 
Population 527 20,416 8,037 1,314 39,858 
Government Managerial Form 527 0.503 0.500 0 1 
      
Notes: This article uses three samples: municipalities with population ranged from 17,500 to 32,500, 
15,000 to 35,000, and 10,000 to 40,000. Those three samples include 87, 119, and 187 municipalities, 
respectively. Government managerial form is a binary variable which equals one when a municipality 




Before reporting the formal RD estimation, figures 3.3 to 3.5 present the graphic 
evidence for the differences in means of the outcomes of interest between municipalities 
with and without home rule status in a narrow margin. Specifically, figure 3.3 and figure 
3.4 show the total own-source revenue and revenue diversification by the population for 
municipalities with a population from 10,000 to 40,000. With 25,000 as the cutoff, 
municipalities on the left constitute controls, while municipalities on the right are “treated” 
by home rule. As figure 3.3 shows, a discontinuity in total own-source revenue is near the 
population threshold. Figure 3.4 shows a similar result for revenue diversification. Those 
figures provide suggestive evidence that adopting home rule matters for the total own-
source revenue and revenue diversification for Illinois municipalities. On the other hand, 
figure 3.5 shows no significant discontinuity in revenue volatility between home rule and 





Note: This graph plots the results of a local linear regression without covariates. The running variable 
is the distance of municipality’s population from home rule threshold. 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of Total Own Source Revenue by Population 
 
 
Note: This graph plots the results of a local linear regression without covariates. The running variable 
is the distance of municipality’s population from home rule threshold. 





Note: The y-axis only reports the total revenue volatility by total revenue volatility approach. This graph 
plots the results of a local linear regression without covariates. The running variable is the distance of 
municipality’s population from home rule threshold. 
Figure 3.5 Distribution of Total Revenue Volatility by Population 
 
Tables 3.3 reports the primary results of the model. Collectively, these results 
indicate that Illinois municipalities with home rule experience a significantly higher level 
of total own-source general revenues and revenue diversification, but it has no statistically 
significant effect on revenue stability. Since the results are similar across bandwidth, the 
discussion focuses on those results estimated with the smallest bandwidth. Panel A of table 
3.3 displays the estimated first-stage coefficients, which is the effect of passing the 
population threshold on actual home rule status. The coefficients are positive and 
significant, suggesting a strong correlation between them. These results support the validity 
of the instrument. 
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We begin the discussion of our estimation results with total own-source revenue, 
reported in panel B. Columns 1 to 3 present the results of the effects of home rule on total 
own-source revenue for different bandwidths a quadratic polynomial. The coefficients in 
the first column indicate that the adoption of home rule increases local own-source 
revenues by 304 percent for Illinois small municipalities. Given that previous studies have 
shown that the effects of home rule are trivial for large municipalities (Hendrick 2002; 
Wood 2011), this finding suggests that the impacts of home rule are not the same across all 
municipalities. Other columns show that this significant effect of home rule on local own-
source revenue is consistent, varying different choices of bandwidths. 
Panel C reports the results for revenue diversification. In particular, the results 
indicate that home rule municipalities experience a 44-percentage-point significant 
increase in revenue diversification. This result suggests that home rule makes small 
municipalities less dependent on property taxes and relying more on each revenue source. 
The result is robust varying bandwidths. While this finding of positive impact is consistent 
with previous studies (Hendrick 2002), the magnitude of that is larger than expected.   
Lastly, Panel D presents the estimated results of the impact of home rule on revenue 
volatility. Surprisingly, home rule has little impact on revenue volatility. The insignificant 
results remain similar with different settings of bandwidth or polynomial. This finding casts 
doubts on the positive relationship between revenue diversification and revenue stability 




Table 3.3 The Effect of Home Rule on Own Source Revenue and Revenue Diversification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Quad. Quad. Quad. 
Pop. Bandwidth 12500 15000 20000 
Panel A. First Stage, Municipality Home Rule. 
    
Population≧25,000 
0.545*** 0.471*** 0.554*** 
 (0.174) (0.156) (0.112) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel B. Total Own Source Revenue 
    
Home Rule Status 3.045** 2.682** 4.137*** 
 (1.473) (1.197) (1.367) 
Constant 14.678*** 14.787*** 14.465*** 
 (0.300) (0.274) (0.331) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel C. Revenue Diversification 
    
Home Rule Status 0.447** 0.331* 0.490*** 
 (0.220) (0.179) (0.189) 
Constant 0.640*** 0.657*** 0.619*** 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.047) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel D. Revenue Volatility 
    
Home Rule Status -0.524 0.483 0.837 
 (1.074) (0.938) (1.143) 
Constant -4.368*** -4.641*** -4.768*** 
 (0.241) (0.225) (0.267) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Notes: Years fixed effect and municipality managerial form are included but not shown. Total own-
source revenue takes the log form. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Dissect Specific Revenue Source Change 
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After finding the positive impact of home rule on total own-source revenues and 
revenue diversification, this section further explores the mechanism behind this finding by 
examining how the adoption of home rule affects small municipalities’ each revenue source. 
Following Carroll and Johnson (2010), the own-source general revenues are categorized 
into four groups: property taxes, general sales taxes, other taxes, and nontax revenues. 
Those four groups of revenues are examined separately using the same technique as above. 
Table 3.4 reports those results. 
Among the four groups of local own-source revenues, only local sales taxes and 
other taxes experienced a significant increase. In particular, home rule increases local sale 
taxes about 3,500 percent; in the meantime, it also increases other taxes about 1,100 percent. 
The findings confirm the expectation that local governments tend to diversify their revenue 
sources by relying more on revenues other than property taxes with a higher level of local 
autonomy. But the increased amount of those two revenue sources are so large that home 
rule municipalities double their total own-source revenues. On the other hand, property 
taxes and nontax revenues stay at a similar level between home rule and non-home rule 
municipalities. The finding that property taxes remain similar regardless of the home rule 





Table 3.4 The Effect of Home Rule on Specific Revenue Sources 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Quad. Quad. Quad. 
Pop. Bandwidth 12500 15000 20000 
Panel A. Property Tax 
    
Home Rule Status 3.862 -0.181 0.665 
 (3.854) (3.659) (3.831) 
Constant 12.843*** 13.565*** 13.342*** 
 (0.817) (0.754) (0.798) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel B. Local Sales Tax 
    
Home Rule Status 34.652** 40.395*** 56.851*** 
 (14.274) (13.823) (16.232) 
Constant -4.511* -6.574** -9.938** 
 (2.724) (2.850) (3.912) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel C. Other Taxes 
    
Home Rule Status 10.575 11.211** 13.122** 
 (6.479) (5.537) (6.160) 
Constant 8.758*** 8.825*** 7.770*** 
 (1.564) (1.466) (1.640) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel D. Nontax Revenues 
    
Home Rule Status 1.241 0.537 0.897 
 (1.108) (0.899) (0.943) 
Constant 14.090*** 14.255*** 14.197*** 
 (0.239) (0.218) (0.223) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Notes: Years fixed effect and municipality managerial form are included but not shown. All outcome 
variables take the log form. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. 





To check the robustness of our results, we conduct a number of robustness checks. 
First, we adopt two additional measures of revenue volatility to further investigate the 
revenue volatility and control for the possibility of essential variations in revenues. The 
first one is the Underlying Volatility (UV) Index, proposed by Rakow (2016). The UV 
index decomposes aggregated volatility into the volatility of individual revenues and 
weights with the importance of each revenue for the government--the share of each 
revenue.9 The second one is the year-over-year measure, which uses the difference between 
the observed value for a single year and the expected value (Seegert 2015). Appendix table 
A1 shows these results, which support the previous finding that home rule has little effect 
on revenue volatility. 
We also conduct robustness checks for the model specification. We examine the 
functional form by replacing the quadratic polynomial with a linear polynomial. Also, we 
redo the estimation with all covariates to examine whether our main results are sensitive to 
covariates. Appendix tables A3 and A4 show the results. Overall, the results of robustness 




The intention of home rule is to preserve to the great extent local self-governance, 
based on the idea of allowing it to be done by the people at the lowest level of government. 
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Opponents of small municipalities’ home rule argue that states can address local issues 
more efficiently since they possess more expertise and can produce greater uniformity of 
governance and regulation (Richard 2003). Nevertheless, in an era of prevailing fiscal 
stresses and pressure on spending at the state level (Chapman 2008; Mullins and Pagano 
2005; Bifulco et al. 2012; Maher et al. 2016), home rule offers small municipalities another 
method of maintaining effective governance. The first finding suggests that home rule 
increases total own-source revenues, which has been emphasized as the precursor to 
effective governance by studies of small municipalities (Buettner and Wildasin 2006; 
Zafra-Gómez, Antonio, and Muñiz 2010). 
With sufficient fiscal and managerial capacities, small municipalities are more 
likely to attract outside managerial professionals and enhance managerial capacity. Then, 
small municipalities are likely to be flexible in delivering services: through providing 
services self-financed, applying for grants from the higher level of governments, financing 
capital projects from the municipal bond market, and entering into outsourcing agreement 
with private contractors (Mohr, Deller, and Halstead 2010; Simonsen, Robbins and 
Helgerson 2001), leading to effective pursue it of local development (Hall 2008). 
An increase of own-source revenues also means relying less on aid from the higher 
level of governments. Small municipalities can tailor service provisions according to the 
local needs, alleviating the constraints of the higher level of governments on local spending. 
Moreover, given that fiscal aid from the federal and state governments have been declining 
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due to their own fiscal difficulties (Mullins and Pagano 2005; Maciag and Wogan 2017), 
such increases of own-source revenues filling these deficits is crucial for small 
municipalities.   
This article also notes the differential impact of home rule on various revenue 
sources. That is, home rule has little impact on property taxes and nontax revenues, but it 
enormously increases the collection of other taxes, especially local sales taxes. While the 
finding of home rule’s trivial effects on property taxes is consistent with previous studies 
(Dye and McGuire 1997), the enormous increases of local sales taxes and other taxes 
caused by home rule not only make small municipalities less dependent on property taxes 
but also diversifies revenue structures.  
That revenue diversification, however, does not bring revenue stabilization to small 
municipalities. Previous studies usually argue that a diversified revenue structure helps 
local governments to keep revenues stable (Carroll 2009; Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle 2004). 
However, the empirical results show a large increase in revenue diversification but a 
statistically insignificant change in revenue stability after adopting home rule, implying 
that revenue diversification does not necessarily stabilize local revenues. Some recent 
studies show similar findings. Yan (2011) finds that revenue diversification significantly 
decreases the revenue stability of a local government that has a stable economic base. 




Illinois home rule helps their small municipalities become less dependent on 
property taxes. However, the increase of local sales tax also moves municipalities toward 
a more volatile tax base because sales taxes are susceptible to economic downturns (Afonso 
2013). This higher reliance on those tax bases offsets the theoretical benefits of stabilizing 
local revenues through revenue diversification. Hence, local governments have to balance 
between additional revenues and stable revenues carefully.  
 
Conclusion 
While the theory and empirical research depict a general model for the 
decentralized governance under home rule, it does not necessarily apply to small 
municipalities that are expected to operate differently from large municipalities. This 
article explores the effects of adopting home rule on small municipalities by focusing on 
the revenues of Illinois small municipalities. Many previous studies suggest that the impact 
of home rule on local revenues is trivial (Hendrick 2002; Wood 2011), however, those 
findings may not apply to small municipalities. The empirical results of the RD design 
indicate that home rule largely increases total own-source revenues, especially for local 
sales taxes and other taxes that non-home rule municipalities are not allowed to collect. 
Home rule also diversifies local revenue structure but has little effect on revenue stability.  
Those findings not only challenge the previous expectation that home rule would 
not increase local taxes in small municipalities but also cast doubts on the belief that 
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revenue diversification increases the stability of local governments’ own-source revenue. 
Given the finding that home rule does not increase local revenues in large municipalities 
(Hendrich 2002; Wood 2011), our findings imply that state policymakers should be aware 
of the uneven impacts of devolution policies such as home rule. For those 8 states which 
do not apply home rule to some small municipalities, state policymakers should consider 
home rule as a solution for addressing small municipalities’ fiscal insufficient. State 
policymakers in the other home rule states have to note the potential consequences of the 
differential influence of home rule. 
An obvious caveat of this article is the generalizability of the findings. The findings 
of this article are based on the RD design which focuses on municipalities with population 
ranged from 15,000 to 40,000. They cannot be generalized to municipalities far away from 
that range. Additionally, because states vary their setting of home rule, the effects of Illinois 
home rule might not apply to all other states, especially for states with widely different 
home rule settings. Illinois has fiscal distress at the state level (Bifulco et al 2012), such as 
unfunded pensions. The findings of this article may apply to other states with fiscal distress. 
Finally, home rule is a multifaceted institution; it includes many areas of local affairs, such 
as revising zoning regulations. Disentangling the effects of other aspects of home rule is a 





CHAPTER FOUR: HOME RULE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES 
Introduction 
Local government’s services can significantly influence residents’ well-being. 
Local governments, however, face challenges to providing adequate services because of 
Great Recession’s increasing demand for public goods and services and dramatically 
decreasing revenue (Chapman 2008; Hendrick and Crawford 2014). Moreover, local 
governments tend to receive less help from higher levels of government. Reduction in 
federal intergovernmental transfers resulted in a call for states to respond to aid local 
jurisdictions (Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle, 2004), “but state-level fiscal difficulties and the 
general increased role of states in domestic affairs mitigated their ability and/or desire to 
do so” (Mullins and Pagano 2005, p12), especially after the Great Recession with 
dramatically increased fiscal deficits and government borrowing for states (Bifulco et al. 
2012). States have also devolved new functional responsibilities to local governments 
without sufficient fiscal aids. Consequently, local governments ask for power and 
autonomy to make policies (Chapman 2008). 
The Constitution of the United States makes no mention of local governments, and 
the Tenth Amendment reserves authority-giving powers to the states (Zimmerman 1995). 
States, then, have established various rules and institutions that shape the power of local 
governments. Dillon’s Rule is an important example, which creates a context where local 
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governments exercise only those powers expressly granted by the state (Richardson 2011; 
Zimmerman 1995). Although long governed by Dillon’s Rule, municipal governments 
have obtained some degree of local autonomy through home rule. Home rule gives 
municipalities more discretion on making a wide range of policies that have not been 
addressed by the state, including the power to adjust tax rates and establish new taxes 
(Krane, Rigos, and Hill, 2001; Richardson 2011). Many recent studies find that home rule 
tends to increase municipalities’ own-source revenues and buffer revenue shortfalls, 
increasing fiscal health (Hendrick and Crawford 2014; McDonald 2015; Shoag, Tuttle, and 
Veuger 2019).  
Despite the greater fiscal capacity and discretion of home rule municipalities, there 
remain questions about their responses to the local demand for services. Many leading 
theories anticipate a “race to the bottom” by providing less redistributive services for low-
income groups. Other theories, however, raise doubts about whether municipalities have 
the motivation to provide more developmental and allocational services that ensure their 
competitive position with other municipalities. Although some previous studies have 
linked home rule to local expenditures, their findings provide little causal inference. 
To address the question of whether home rule affects the pattern of expenditures in 
local governments, this paper provides quasi-experimental evidence exploring the effects 
of adopting home rule on Illinois municipalities’ expenditures. Taking advantage of the 
mandatory adoption of home rule at populations over 25,000, this paper compares Illinois 
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home rule municipalities with non-home rule municipalities around the population 
threshold, estimating the effects on developmental, redistributive, and allocational services, 
following the three categories of policy arenas of Peterson (1981).Results find home rule 
increases allocational expenditures by 95 percent, using a fuzzy regression discontinuity 
(RD) design with the discontinuity coming from the population threshold. Meanwhile, 
home rule has little influence on either developmental or redistributive expenditures. Taken 
together, findings imply that home rule local governments tend to provide more basic but 
necessary “housekeeping” services.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the following section introduces how 
home rule shapes local governments, then reviews the literature on local expenditures and 
home rule’s link with local expenditures. Next, the institutional setting for Illinois home 
rule, the methodology, and data are introduced. The next section reports the empirical 
findings, ending with a discussion of the research findings and policy implications. 
 
Home Rule Shapes Local Governments 
Traditionally, local governments in the U.S. are regulated by Dillon’s rule that 
derived from two court decisions issued by Judge John F. Dillon of Iowa in 1868. It affirms 
the narrow interpretation of a local government’s authority, in which a locality may 
exercise only those powers expressly granted by the state (Richardson 2011). In effect, 
state governments can place whatever restrictions they choose on their municipalities, so 
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long as such rules do not violate the state’s constitution (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001). 
Although long governed by Dillon’s Rule, municipalities obtained some degree of 
local autonomy using home rule throughout the twentieth century. Home rule, in general, 
is defined as “the ability of a local government to act and make policy in all areas that have 
not been designated to be of statewide interest through general law, state constitutional 
provisions, or initiatives and referenda” (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001, 2). The goal of home 
rule is to give localities more discretion in making policies, solving problems to improve 
local public goods and service provision, and protecting local governments from 
interference by the state government. Since Missouri first adopted home rule in 1875, 40 
states have adopted home rule (Russell and Bostrom 2016), although home rule’s granted 
powers differ across states. In recent years, Nebraska and West Virginia have started to 
allow some of their localities to adopt home rule; home rule has gained salience again. 
Scholars often view home rule as expanding local autonomy and decentralizing 
decision-making power from the state to local governments (Hill 1993; Turnbull and Geon 
2006; Wood 2011; Zimmerman 1981). Normatively, decentralization allows local 
governments to be closer to the people and better reflect individual preferences. 
Competition among communities should also lead to greater efficiency and innovation 
(Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956). Decentralization provides strong fiscal and political incentives, 
such as promotion or reelection, for keep local officials accountable (Bardhan 2002; Jin, 
Qian, and Weingast 2005). Opponents of home rule argue state government control ensures 
71 
 
greater uniformity of goods and services provision and that states possess more technical 
expertise and professional capacity (Richardson 2003). Overall, the idea that home rule 
helps localities provide services more efficiently and meet residents’ demands dominate 
the literature. 
Home rule not only shapes the state-local relationship but also reshapes local 
governments. Home rule often provides localities more discretion in making fiscal policies, 
including changing in tax rates and designing new revenue sources without state approval. 
This increases localities’ fiscal policy space and ability to address financial problems 
(Hendrick and Crawford 2014). Although traditional theory implies that home rule has little 
effect on local taxes, recent studies find home rule tends to increase local governments’ 
own source-revenues, buffer revenue shortfalls, and enhance local fiscal conditions 
(Hendrick and Crawford 2014; McDonald 2015; Shoag, Tuttle, and Veuger 2019). With 
more own source revenues, localities can tailor expenditures according to local needs, free 
from the controls of higher levels of government (Braco et al. 2015; Volden, 2007). 
Federal and state governments incentivize local governments to provide particular 
functions, such as social welfare policies, by offering a wide range of grant programs. 
Those grants, however, have costs, including searching for grant opportunities, submitting 
grant applications, and seeking earmarked funding (Volden 2007). Federal closed-ended 
matching grants require local governments with enough fiscal capacity to meet the 
matching requirement (Collins and Gerber 2006; Gramlich 1977; Hall 2008a; Hall 2008b). 
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Since home rule municipalities tend to generate stronger fiscal capacity, they have 
flexibility in deciding whether to provide services either on their own or through 
intergovernmental grants (Craw 2010). Local governments could apply for grants based on 
their own need and goals, with grants ranging from those providing social welfare support 
to building infrastructure highways for stimulating local development.  
Local capacity aside, home rule offers municipalities more autonomy in making 
policies and frees localities from some state constraints, such as tax and expenditure 
limitations and zoning laws. For example, zoning has been shown to have significant 
impacts on the location of low-income populations since the affordable rental housing often 
has more restrictions (Levine 2010). Municipalities with home rule, and thus the ability to 
alter zoning laws, may need fewer redistributive policies (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001) 
because it is relatively easy for local officials to create zoning that ensures new entrants are 
of higher income (Peterson 1981; Schneider 1989). 
 
Public Service Provision in Local Governments 
Local governments face more constraints than federal and state governments for 
many resources and inputs because they operate in an environment with more competition 
for residents and businesses to create their fiscal bases. Since residents and businesses 
move to the community where the public goods and services best satisfy their demand 
(Tiebout, 1956), keeping economic prosperity or maximizing the fiscal surplus is essential 
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for local interests (Buchanan 1971). Without economic prosperity, local governments may 
fail to attract residents and businesses and lose fiscal bases (Peterson, 1981). Competition 
forces local governments to pursue their economic well-being and stay away from 
jeopardizing activities (Peterson 1981; Wong 1988). Unlike the federal government, local 
governments cannot regulate the flow of productive resources, such as labor and capital, 
through tariffs or migration policy. With such constraints, local governments have to make 
policy choices to allocate the resources to policy arenas with different priorities (Buchanan 
1971; Peterson 1981).  
Peterson (1981) divides local policies into three arenas: developmental, allocational, 
and redistributive.3 Developmental policies strengthen the local economy and the local tax 
base and generate resources that can be used to improve residents’ welfare. Developmental 
policies interest local government leaders for two reasons. First, developmental policies 
keep the local economy prosperous and protecting the tax base, necessary to compete with 
other localities in retaining and attracting middle and high-income residents and 
businesses,. Second, developmental policies generate support for local political leaders. 
Both local elites and many residents support developmental policies since they benefit from 
developmental programs (Wong 1988; Schneider 1989). Elected officials find it easier to 
gain support by making credible promises about developmental policies relative to other 
 
3 Educational policies are classified as an individual category because they have both developmental and 
redistributive attributes so are inappropriate to be included in either one. This paper does not include educational 
expenditures in the analysis because municipalities now play a lesser role in directly providing educational services. 
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types of policies such as infrastructure projects because they are observable to residents. In 
contrast, it is difficult for voters to assess the quality and efficiency of education or social 
welfare policies due to information asymmetry (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). Therefore, local 
politicians gain political advantage by selecting developmental policies. Taken together, 
local governments are more likely to place developmental policies ahead of other policies.  
Redistributive policies benefit low-income residents directly but have less 
observable benefits to other residents. Redistributive policies tend to put the tax burden on 
higher-income households while being beneficial to low-income households, which 
discourages the entry of productive resources, against the local interest of economic 
prosperity (Peterson 1981; Sharp and Maynard-Moody 1991). In addition, redistributive 
issues are traditionally considered as the national government’s responsibility because 
redistribution often creates spillover effects beyond local boundaries. Federal and state 
governments have fewer constraints on their policy and political options; it is effective for 
them to address that spillover and provide pro-social welfare policies (Oates 1972; Peterson 
1981; Stone 1989). Local governments thus have fewer incentives to prioritize 
redistributive policies.  
Relative to developmental and redistributive policies, allocational policies have 
more or less neutral effects on the local economy. They consist of the basic but necessary 
“housekeeping” services such as police protection, sewer services, and public employment. 
An adequate level of housekeeping services is necessary for local functions (Peterson 
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1995). Basic service expenditures are more stable and less susceptible to interjurisdictional 
competition (Booth, 1988; Jordan 2001). Consequently, allocational policies are not the top 
priority for municipalities. In sum, municipal governments are likely to prioritize 
developmental policies over both redistributive and allocational policies for maintaining or 
improving the city’s economic prosperity. 
Local needs also influence local policy. Local governments make policy in a 
political process that devotes resources to needed services (Craw 2010; Hajnal and 
Trounstine 2010; Sharp and Maynard-Moody 1991). Political influences interact with 
economic constraints and generate a wide range of policy alternatives (Percival, Johnson, 
and Neiman, 2009; Wong 1988). Local ideology and preferences are crucial in determining 
local policies because elected officials need public support in order to win elections (Dahl 
1961; Meier, Stewart, and England 1991). “Any official who does not heed this public 
pressure risks losing office, local governments should incorporate the preferences of a 
range of different citizens when enacting policy” (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010, 1133). 
In choosing among the three policy arenas, previous studies have given little 
attention to the degree of authority localities possess. Localities not only differ in their 
economic resources but also vary in their legal authority to make policies. As stated earlier, 
some states give more self-governing power to municipalities, including taxing, policing, 
and zoning, while municipalities in other states can exercise only those powers expressly 
granted by the state (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001; Richardson 2011). Federal and state 
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governments also play a role in local expenditure policiesby influencing local services 
through the incentives of intergovernmental grants (Gramlich 1977; Oates, 1972), or 
mandate the provision of certain services (Hoyt and Toma 1989). Thus, local autonomy 
largely shapes the decision-making process and the final choice of local policies (Basolo 
and Huang 2001; Wong 1988). 
  
Related Literature 
Although home rule brings capacity and discretion to localities, localities still need 
to make tradeoffs across policy arenas. This paper considers whether home rule would 
affect municipalities’ preferences for developmental policies over redistributive or 
allocational policies. Previous studies, however, have mixed arguments. 
Some studies suggest that localities with increased fiscal capacity and local 
autonomy would continue placing developmental policies ahead of others. For example, 
Choi et al. (2010) examine Florida county governments and find that home rule increases 
spending on developmental policies more than the spending on redistributive policies. 
Percival, Johnson, and Neiman (2009) provide evidence that wealthy counties also increase 
spending on development but reduce spending on redistribution in California. On the other 
hand, other studies argue that developmental policies would be less attractive to both local 
officials and residents when localities have a stronger fiscal condition as expected under 
home rule. Those local governments are more competitive interjurisdictionally and their 
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residents may oppose development to avoid development-related problems such as 
pollution or traffic jam (Bollens 1990; Jimenez 2014; Schneider 1989; Simonelli 2014). 
Empirically, more studies show little relationship between developmental expenditures and 
greater local autonomy or better fiscal conditions (Basolo and Huang 2001; Craw 2015; 
Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Jimenez 2014). 
Additionally, more fiscal autonomy means more responsibility comes with the 
increased power. Home rule shifts control rights from the state to local governments, 
tending to expand service deliveries as authority goes to those more responsive to resident 
needs and preferences (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2001; Faguet 2004). Empirical evidence 
has shown that home rule municipalities tend to increase spending on social welfare 
responding to residents’ ideology (Bunch 2014; Percival, Johnson, and Neiman 2009). 
Moreover, home rule municipalities are more likely to spend more on redistribution 
because they have the capacity to do so without jeopardizing fiscal health (Craw 2010; 
Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Jimenez 2014). However, some empirical studies suggest the 
opposite, finding the devolution of social services from the state to the local level does not 
benefit low-income groups. In particular, they find that those services may experience 
declining caseloads or benefit middle and high-income groups more (Kim and Fording 
2010; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008), which suggests home rule municipalities may not 
be prone to redistribution. 
Home rule makes local governments reflect local needs; it would respond both to 
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the needs of low-income residents and the preferences of middle and high-income residents. 
While the provision of redistributive services may respond to the needs of low-income 
residents, the primary interest of middle and high-income residents may be to protect their 
quality of life through better parks, recreation, and transportation (Bollens 1990; Jimenez 
2014). Hence, fiscally healthy municipalities may spend more on luxuries in the context of 
decentralization to prevent middle-class exit (Joassart-Marcelli 2010). Empirically, many 
studies reveal that local governments value allocational policies more than Peterson 
initially predicts. Jordan (2003) also finds local governments are more willing to sacrifice 
developmental functions than allocational functions to reduce the threat of middle-class 
exit. The middle-class is less likely to move to another place with a decrease in parks than 
with a reduction in policing. Choi et al. (2010) note that allocational expenditures 
experience the largest in response to an overall increase in expenditures among the three 
policy expenditures. Meanwhile, a few studies imply that home rule municipalities reduce 
allocational expenditures in exchange for local development or redistribution (Hajnal and 
Trounstine; Percival, Johnson, and Neiman 2009).  
These mixed and somewhat contradictory empirical findings may be results of 
many factors, including the change of grants or the the state-local relationship (Basolo and 
Huang 2001). Methodologically, previous studies with either a panel or cross-sectional 
analysis do not offer proper counterfactuals to home rule municipalities and also may fail 
to address the endogeneity problem. Home rule as an institution is the aggregation of public 
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preferences, reflecting local governmental political, demographic, and economic 
characteristics (McDonald and Gabrini 2014; Wood 2011). For example, many previous 
studies look at home rule counties in Florida where counties could adopt home rule through 
a referendum. The estimation results may be biased without addressing endogeneity bias 
that might stem from the self-selection into home rule status in response to increasing 
public services. Also, noneconomic factors such as neighborhood activism, black 
representation, and routine service delivery can play a role in the policy choice process 
(Wong 1988). While previous studies attempt to account for those influences by controlling 
for observable variables, it is hard to rule out all other potential influences. In sum, how 
home rule may affect local expenditure policies is uncertain; further investigation is needed.  
This paper attempts to provide quasi-experimental evidence by focusing on Illinois 
municipalities which are required to adopt home rule once a municipality has a population 
above a 25,000-population threshold. Focusing on the observations near the threshold, this 
paper uses a fuzzy regression discontinuity design by taking advantage of exogenously 
assigned home rule status. In other words, the rationale of the design is that non-home rule 
municipalities just below the threshold are useful counterfactual to those home rule 
municipalities just above the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). 
 
Illinois Home Rule 
Illinois is a Dillon’s rule state, meaning cities, towns, counties, and other types of 
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localities are the “creature of the state.” Under Dillion’s rule, localities can only exercise 
powers explicitly granted to them by the state. Illinois Constitutional Amendment provided 
municipalities an optional home rule system in 1970, under the efforts of those 
municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan area to gain more local autonomy (Banovetz 
2002).  
Illinois home rule municipalities possess powers so long as they are not prohibited 
by state or federal law. Home rule units are not only capable of changing tax rates within a 
specific range but also are given wide discretion to design new revenues, including 
revenues not authorized in the statutes. Most importantly, home rule units can use that 
power without a referendum or legislative authorization, while non-home rule units need 
legislative approval to change tax rates. In addition, home rule units are free from property 
tax limitations and the prior appropriation requirement, giving home rule units room to 
manage their budgets (Hendrick and Crawford 2014; Wandling 2001).4  
Moreover, home rule municipalities have more options on local programs and 
service provision. Home rule municipalities may additionally offer residential development 
abatements, enterprise zone programs, and they also have extensive powers regarding land 
assembly and industrial park development. While both home rule and non-home rule 
municipalities may participate in state development programs, non-home rule 
municipalities are limited due to the lack of policy flexibility (Wandling 2001). Home rule 
 
4 Prior appropriation requirement limits the revenue sources for paying outsourcing water supply of the 
municipality by asking payments shall be solely from operation of the waterworks system of the municipality.  
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municipalities also may pass any zoning ordinance as long as it does not violate state 
constitutional requirements.5 
In Illinois, a municipality, meaning city, village, or incorporated town can adopt 
home rule in two ways. First, municipalities of more than 25,000 residents automatically 
become a home rule unit unless a majority of residents vote to drop it, which ensures that 
all large municipalities possess autonomy. On the other hand, municipalities with less than 
25,000 residents can adopt home rule by referendum. While home rule units may vary in 
the way they adopt home rule, the powers the Constitution grants them are identical. A 
home rule unit can abolish home rule by referendum as well. More than thirty referendums 
have been held to decide whether or not a municipality’s existing home rule system should 
be retained, but only five municipalities eventually passed such retention referenda and 
abolished home rule. 
 
Research Design and Data 
This paper uses Illinois municipal-level data in 2002, 2007, 2010, and 2012. Home 
rule data come from the Illinois Secretary of State, which reports the time and the approach 
by which a municipality adopted home rule. Government finance data are from the Annual 
Financial Dataset of the State of Illinois Comptroller, which covers most local governments 
in Illinois, except a few extremely small municipalities. Demographic data such as race, 
 




unemployment rate, and median household income come from the five-year American 
Community Survey (ACS) estimate (2009-2017). The 2007 data is filled by extrapolation 
and interpolation. The 2002 demographic data is from census data. Ideology data use the 
two party Democratic presidential vote share at the county level coming from Tausanovitch 
and Warshaw (2013). Government form data come from the Illinois City/County 
Management Association, which lists local governments that take a managerial 
government form and reports the year they adopted it. A racial diversification index is 
constructed following Jimenez (2014). 
This paper has three outcomes of interest: the logarithm of municipal governments’ 
total expenditures for developmental, redistributive, and allocational services. It is 
important to note that there is no consensus for placing specific spending subcategories 
into those three policy arenas. This paper closely follows recent empirical work (Choi et 
al. 2010; Jimenez 2014; Schneider 1989). The specific government functions fitting into 
each policy arena are as follow: developmental (transportation and public works, clean land 
and water supplies, public utility operation, capital outlay), redistributive (social services, 
housing and redevelopment projects), allocational (general government, public safety, 
corrections, judiciary and legal, culture and recreation, debt, depreciation, and others). 
This chapter also uses a RD design with the threshold coming from the home rule 
population threshold. The municipality’s population is used as the running variable; and, 
the 25,000-population threshold of home rule adoption in Illinois is the cutoff. RD design 
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based on population threshold has been popular recently (discussed in detail in chapter 3). 
I estimate the model using different population bandwidths: 12,500, 15,000, and 20,000, 
to show the robustness of the results to the different choice of bandwidth. 
 
Results 
Prior to reporting the formal estimated results, figures 3 to 5 present graphical 
evidence for the differences in means of the local expenditures on the three policy arenas 
for Illinois municipalities in a narrow population range. Specifically, figure 3 and figure 4 
show the developmental expenditures and allocational expenditures by the population for 
municipalities with a population from 10,000 to 40,000. With 25,000 as the cutoff, 
municipalities on the left constitute controls, while municipalities on the right are “treated” 
by home rule. Both figure 3 and figure 4 show a discontinuity near the population threshold 
and an increase of expenditures on the right side of the cutoff. These figures imply that 
adopting home rule increases local spending on developmental policies and allocational 
policies for Illinois municipalities. On the other hand, figure 5 shows less discontinuity in 
redistributive expenditures between home rule and non-home rule municipalities near the 





Note: This graph plots the distribution of municipalities’ spending on developmental policies. The 
running variable is the distance of municipality’s population from home rule threshold. 
Figure 16 Distribution of Developmental Expenditures by Population 
 
Note: This graph plots the distribution of municipalities’ spending on allocational policies. The running 
variable is the distance of municipality’s population from home rule threshold. 





Note: This graph plots the distribution of municipalities’ spending on redistributive policies. The 
running variable is the distance of municipality’s population from home rule threshold. 
Figure 18 Distribution of Redistributive Expenditures by Population 
 
Table A1 shows the estimated first-stage coefficients, which examine the validity 
of the instrument. All these coefficients are positive and significant across different 
quadratic polynomials, suggesting a significant effect of passing the population threshold 
on actual home rule status. The instrument, then, predicts home rule status. 
Table 2 reports the primary results of the RD estimation for different types of 
services. The discussion of the estimation results begins with developmental expenditures. 
Columns 1 to 3 present the results of the effects of home rule on developmental 
expenditures with different bandwidths. In the first column, the coefficient of home rule is 
negative and statistically significant. The coefficients of home rule, however, turn 
statistically insignificant with larger bandwidths in columns 2 and 3, which have larger 
sample sizes, indicating that the negative finding is causal near the threshold but that 
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endogeneity is present and dominant for larger bandwidths. The estimation results suggest 
that home rule has a causal impact on developmental expenditures and that endogeneity 
might have obscured this finding in earlier literature. 
Columns 4 to 6 present the results for allocational expenditures. Specifically, the 
result in column 5 indicates that home rule significantly increases allocational expenditures 
by 95.8 percent. Given that allocational expenditures are the largest spending category for 
a local government (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010; Peterson 1981), the magnitude of that 
effect is substantial. Other columns show that such a large effect of home rule on 
allocational expenditure is consistent across varying different choices of bandwidth. 
Next, columns 7 to 9 display results examining the impact of home rule on 
redistributive expenditures. Surprisingly, home rule has little impact on redistributive 
expenditures. The insignificant results remain similar varying different bandwidths. While 
the sign of those coefficients is positive, the insignificant results fail to support the belief 
that local governments are likely to respond to the needs of disadvantaged groups in a 
decentralized system and provide redistributive services (Craw 2015; Peterson 1981). 
As for control variables, municipalities with higher total revenues, regardless of the 
revenue source, tend to spend more on each type of service. Governments with a 
professional administrator are likely to spend less on redistributive expenditures. 
Interestingly, race diversification has a differential influence on expenditures. The more 
diversified a municipality is the higher expenditures on allocational expenditures and the 
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lower on developmental expenditures. On the other hand, there is no evidence of an effect 
of race on redistributive expenditures. Collectively, these results indicate that Illinois home 
rule resulted in a statistically significant increase in allocational and decrease in 
developmental expenditures.   
 
Table 4.1 The Effect of Home Rule on Expenditure Policies 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Developmental Expenditures  Allocational Expenditures  Redistributive Expenditures 
Pop. Bandwidth 12,500 15,000 20,000  12,500 15,000 20,000  12,500 15,000 20,000 
            
Home Rule Status -1.054** -0.627 -0.801  0.622** 0.958** 1.016**  8.347 10.111 5.419 
 (0.495) (0.494) (0.618)  (0.291) (0.448) (0.473)  (8.655) (7.325) (7.768) 
Managerial Form 0.023 -0.015 -0.011  -0.018 -0.005 0.007  -2.801** -2.280** -2.643*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.056)  (0.037) (0.043) (0.035)  (1.230) (1.116) (0.871) 
Total Revenues  0.936*** 0.782*** 0.866***  1.008*** 0.854*** 0.872***  2.498 3.549*** 2.952*** 
 (0.081) (0.136) (0.117)  (0.054) (0.137) (0.096)  (1.539) (1.357) (0.984) 
Total Debts 0.002 -0.001 -0.012  0.011 0.041** 0.042***  0.398** 0.302* 0.169 





-0.444***  0.378*** 0.347*** 0.339***  3.899 2.711 2.405 
 (0.174) (0.159) (0.143)  (0.120) (0.109) (0.087)  (3.465) (3.011) (2.282) 
Observations 302 417 680  302 417 680  302 417 680 
Notes: Years fixed effect are included but not shown. All outcome variables take the log form. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Robustness check 
The results of the above estimation show that home rule affects allocational and 
developmental expenditures. A concern is whether those results could be driven by chance. 
This section performs two alternative model specifications to check the robustness of the 
88 
 
results. First, the model uses linear and third-order polynomials to control for unobserved 
differences between home rule and non-home rule municipalities. Even though Gelman 
and Imbens (2018) recommend local quadratic polynomials, it is common in some studies 
to control for various polynomials (Lee and Lemieux 2010). To test the sensitivity of results 
to alternative polynomials, models are estimated with linear and third-order polynomials 
instead of a quadratic polynomial. Table A2 reports the results, which are similar to those 
using quadratic polynomial: home rule positively and significantly increases local 
allocational expenditures and decreases developmental expenditures. 
Next, a placebo or falsification test is estimated by applying a feigned adoption 
threshold for home rule. The Illinois constitution grants municipalities with the population 
above 25,000 home rule status. For those municipalities that have a population just below 
25,000, they might adjust their budget in advance due to a forthcoming home rule status. 
To rule out that possibility, the model is estimated with a 20,000-population threshold. 
Specifically, the original instrument that uses the 25,000-population threshold is replaced 
with a 20,000-population threshold to indicate municipalities’ actual home rule status. In 
this case, we do not expect home rule status to affect local expenditures. Table A3 displays 
the results, showing that home rule has no significant impact on any category of local 
expenditures in this case. This increases confidence in the findings. Lastly, we re-run the 
model by incorporating demographic factors, and the results, in Table A4, are consistent 




Discussion and Conclusion 
The devolution of power changes the provision of local public services and goods. 
Home rule enhances local fiscal conditions, but we know little about its consequences on 
public services. This paper contributes to this question by exploring the differential impacts 
of home rule on local expenditure policies. Using Illinois municipalities as the sample, the 
results show that home rule increases allocational and developmental expenditures that 
provide basic and necessary housekeeping services for residents and encourage local 
economic development. Given that the median household income is about $63,000 in the 
sample, the median voters’ preference may lead the direction of the local expenditure policy. 
This supports the argument that middle and high-income residents protect their quality of 
life by asking for more housekeeping services and less development. 
Furthermore, while this finding of a positive impact of home rule on allocational 
and negative impact on developmental expenditures is consistent with some earlier studies 
(Jordan 2003; Percival, Johnson, and Neiman, 2009), the magnitude is larger than expected. 
This finding is inconsistent with residents’ rejection of growth-related problems. Taking 
those two findings together, they support Peterson’s later argument that “residential 
amenities—parks, schools, recreational facilities—can be at least as important to the 




Meanwhile, the results do not support the argument that fiscally affluent localities 
tend to provide more redistribution. Instead, home rule municipalities do not spend a 
significantly higher amount of the budget on redistribution than non-home rule 
municipalities. This finding is consistent with Jimenez who concludes that “the primary 
interest of wealthy residents is to protect their community’s existing fiscal wealthy by 
limiting access of the poor to their enclaves. They do so by offering very few, if any, 
redistributive programs.” (Jimenez 2014, 255).  The result is most consistent with home 
rule’s having little to do with decisions about redistributive demands, on net. 
An important question is what other factors might explain home rule municipalities’ 
different expenditures on allocational and developmental services? An explanation is the 
decline of state aid to local services. Illinois experienced a fiscal crisis and had to cut 
billions of state spending from 2011 on (Bifulco et al. 2012), including intergovernmental 
transfers to local governments. State fiscal stress makes states decrease their share for local 
developmental and allocational expenditures, while redistributive expenditures are not 
affected as much by state fiscal stress. States seem to be sacrificing public safety spending 
in order to support public welfare expenditures (Jimenez 2009). Allocational spending is 
the most sensitive to changes in the state government’s fiscal conditions. Illinois home rule 
municipalities may be flexible in balancing the declining state aid for public safety and 
basic services by increasing spending on those fields (Hendrick and Crawford 2014). 
From an efficiency perspective, the increasing spending on allocational policy 
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increases local efficiency. Since local governments have better information about local 
preferences, they are better able to tailor housekeeping services such as public safety. More 
important, those basic housekeeping services usually have a low degree of spillovers, 
making local provision preferable. In contrast, redistributive policies can have large 
spillovers, which leads to an under-provision of those services if locally provided (Bardhan 
2002; Besley and Coate 2003; Oates 1972). Hence, it is more efficient for the higher levels 
of government to provide redistributive services. Given that the results show that home 
rule increases allocational expenditures, it implies that home rule does improve the 
efficiency of public services. 
The findings call for the attention from the higher levels of government on 
intervening in local redistribution. Illinois municipalities avoid investing in redistribution, 
as Peterson (1981) argued. When local governments face fiscal difficulties, local 
governments are incapable and unwilling to take charge of redistribution, which is a 
function of federal and state governments.  
Finally, this study has limitations. The first concern is the generalizability of the 
findings. The findings of this paper are based on the RD design, which focuses on 
municipalities with a population ranged from 15,000 to 40,000, and in important ways, 
narrower intervals; they may not be applied to municipalities far away from that range. 
Second, the estimation cannot show the dynamic effects of home rule. In other words, we 
cannot identify how a home rule municipality changes its budget over the long run.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
The debate on the division of labor between various levels of governments is 
ongoing. The local power is important to discuss in this era in which there are fiscal 
difficulties at the federal and state level. The aid from the federal and state governments 
has been declining (Mullins and Pagano 2005; Maciag and Wogan 2017), forcing local 
governments to find a new solution instead of playing a traditional role in the vertical 
relationship of governments. This dissertation has brought new evidence to advance our 
understanding of the changes in the state-local relationship by looking at the state-imposed 
institutions. 
The second chapter reviews the status of three state-imposed fiscal institutions 
across states. The finding shows that states vary in the assignment of the institutions to 
local governments. Some states just assign home rule to municipalities and counties to 
provide them more self-governance in their financing tools and have all municipalities, 
counties, and school districts face constraints for raising revenues and incurring debts. 
Other states offer not only certain types of local governments to adopt home rule but also 
grant certain sizes of municipalities home rule.  
Then two chapters empirically examine the effects of home rule on local 
governments from two angles. Home rule gives localities more autonomy in making 
policies and reshapes the state-local relationship. All of it is intended to preserve to a great 
extent local self-governance. The whole idea is to allow it to be done by the people at the 
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lowest level of government. Previous studies of decentralization under home rule suggest 
that government efficiency is expected to improve without increasing local taxes. Chapter 
3 explores the effect of adopting home rule on small municipalities’ revenues by focusing 
on municipalities in Illinois where the adoption of home rule changes exogenously at a 
given population threshold. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, the empirical 
evidence shows that the adoption of home rule has a significant and large impact on the 
level of total own-source revenue, especially for local sales taxes and other taxes, but it has 
limited influence on property taxes. 
Chapter 4 investigates how the adoption of home rule changes local governments 
by exploring municipalities’ expenditure policy. Traditional theory predicts that local 
governments are more likely to place developmental expenditure policies ahead of either 
redistributive or allocational policies because they operate in an environment in which they 
have to compete with each other for residents, businesses as their fiscal base. However, it 
may not necessarily apply when localities are granted home rule. The empirical evidence 
shows that the adoption of home rule has significant and positive effects on allocational 
expenditures. This finding highlights the importance of basic public services. That is, a 
city’s police, fire protection, recreation, and sanitation facilities are as important to 





This dissertation advances the study of the state-local relationship by three streams.  
The first is the comprehensive scrutiny of the status of three institutions across states. The 
development of state-imposed institutions has been changing over time. Even though some 
previous studies have looked at specific institutions, we know little about what states have 
imposed on their local governments after the work done by ACIR in the 1990s. This 
dissertation not only updates our information on the institutions each state has established 
but also shows some patterns of the distribution.  
This dissertation also contributes to the literature of decentralization by looking at 
home rule. Home rule extends the discussion of decentralization on the state-local level 
which previous studies often neglect. This dissertation has shown that such a shift of power 
from state to local changes local governance. Specifically, while previous studies indicate 
that home rule helps to counter extreme cases of revenue loss (Shoag, Tuttle, and Veuger 
2017), and to smooth expenditure volatility (Hendrick and Crawford 2014), this 
dissertation further shows that home rule municipalities increase their total revenues, local 
sales taxes, and spending on allocational services. 
The third contribution is that of research methods. Previous studies often use OLS 
analysis to examine the effects of home rule, which results in bias if home rule is 
endogenous to financial outcomes. Studying Illinois home rule provides a chance to 
estimate the effects of home rule by circumventing the endogeneity and measurement 
problem that previous studies faced. The resulting estimations present not only new 
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evidence that differs from previous studies but also offer empirical evidence on the causal 
effects of home rule adoption. 
 
Future Direction 
While this dissertation has made several contributions to the literature, there are 
abundant opportunities for future research. The second chapter shows that states establish 
various rules and institutions for shaping the power of local governments; and, it also 
presents several patterns of how states establish those three institutions on their local 
governments. While states have some patterns in common, there are many differences in 
their decisions on constraining local governments. To further understand the state-local 
relationship, it is important for us to explore the rationale of those differences. Intuitively, 
people may come up with many factors that could affect a state’s choice of those 
institutions, including culture difference, the heterogeneity of residents’ demand, etc. We 
still know little about the answer until a careful empirical examination has been done.  
Additionally, we know little about how local performance and efficiency is 
influenced by home rule. The findings indicate that home rule municipalities are likely to 
change their revenues and expenditures after having greater discretion. The public services 
provided by local governments are relatively similar across localities. But it does not mean 
that the quality and the efficiency of the services have to increase with home rule (Krane, 
Ebdon, and Bartle, 2004). After all, more governmental expenditures do not necessarily 
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lead to better service. For example, home rule municipalities may spend more on policing, 
which could be a result of raising salaries of police rather than a real improvement of policy 
services.  
Last but not least, future research can look at the spillover effects of home rule. 
Local governments operate in an environment in which they have to compete with each 
other for residents, businesses by providing heterogeneous public goods. Such competition 
makes local governments have to respond to the action of others. It is possible that a local 
government may decide to gain more autonomy in response to the changes of autonomy in 
its neighbors for competition. Future research should move forward toward those directions 








Table A1 Summary Statistics of Institution Indexes 
 County  Municipality  School District 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
               
Home Rule Index 2.24 1.29 0 4  2.58 1.230 0 4      
Referendum Debt Limit 0.70 0.46 0 1  0.76 0.43 0 1  0.78 0.42 0 1 
Debt Ceiling Percent as 
Assessed Valuation 
4.01 5.10 0 25  6.57 7.18 0 30  6.43 8.88 0 50 
TELs Severity Index 14.14 9.26 0 36.5  14.66 9.06 0 36.5  13.58 9.30 0 35.5 
Property Taxes Related TELs 9.95 6.80 0 23.5  13.44 8.14 0 29.5  11.93 8.26 0 33.5 
Overall Budget TELs 0.73 2.48 0 13  0.74 2.49 0 13  1.17 2.85 0 13 




Table A2 Robustness Check: The Effect of Home Rule on Revenue Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Quad. Quad. Quad. 
Pop. Bandwidth 12500 15000 20000 
Panel A. The UV Index 
    
Home Rule Status 1.582 1.366 1.832 
 (1.365) (1.160) (1.203) 
Constant -4.170*** -4.217*** -4.260*** 
 (0.299) (0.268) (0.279) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel B. Year-over-year Volatility 
    
Home Rule Status 2.102 2.453 4.535*** 
 (1.775) (1.613) (1.737) 
Constant 14.299*** 14.232*** 13.786*** 
 (0.372) (0.356) (0.391) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Notes: Years fixed effect and municipality managerial form are included but not shown. 
All three measures of revenue stability take the log form. Robust standard errors, clustered 



















Table A3 Robustness Check: The Effect of Home Rule with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Quad. Quad. Quad. 
Pop. Bandwidth 12500 15000 20000 
Panel A. Total Own Source Revenue 
    
Home Rule Status 1.192 1.776* 2.834*** 
 (0.757) (0.931) (1.009) 
Managerial Form 0.221* 0.183 0.263** 
 (0.128) (0.124) (0.105) 
Debt 0.129** 0.103** 0.109** 
 (0.058) (0.049) (0.043) 
Ideology 2.698*** 2.057*** 2.176*** 
 (0.472) (0.469) (0.374) 
Median Income 0.348** 0.333** 0.267* 
 (0.157) (0.154) (0.145) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel B. Revenue Diversification 
    
Home Rule Status 0.313* 0.239* 0.323* 
 (0.175) (0.118) (0.167) 
Managerial Form 0.030 0.036* 0.046*** 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.018) 
Debt 0.009 0.003 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) 
Ideology 0.201** 0.130* 0.147** 
 (0.095) (0.074) (0.058) 
Median Income -0.041 -0.058* -0.077*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel C. Revenue Volatility 
    
Home Rule Status -0.069 0.720 1.464 
 (0.926) (0.916) (1.157) 
Managerial Form -0.001 0.021 0.080 
 (0.160) (0.144) (0.118) 
Debt 0.034 0.049* 0.033 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.035) 
Ideology -0.693 -1.020** -1.532*** 
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Table A3 (continued)  
 (0.569) (0.467) (0.439) 
Median Income -0.170 -0.256 -0.175 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.178) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Notes: Years fixed effect is included but not shown. Total own-source revenue, debt, and 
median income take the log form. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality 





















Table A4 The Effect of Home Rule on Specific Revenue Sources with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Quad. Quad. Quad. 
Pop. Bandwidth 12500 15000 20000 
Panel A. Property Taxes 
    
Home Rule Status 0.932 -1.817 -2.072 
 (2.886) (3.579) (3.426) 
Managerial Form -0.213 -0.128 0.311 
 (0.657) (0.482) (0.313) 
Debt 0.463* 0.309* 0.488*** 
 (0.268) (0.179) (0.161) 
Ideology 4.106*** 3.101*** 2.563*** 
 (1.028) (1.047) (0.852) 
Median Income 0.758 0.469 0.072 
 (1.067) (0.828) (0.567) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel B. Local Sales Taxes 
    
Home Rule Status 28.209** 40.714*** 55.474*** 
 (12.012) (14.069) (16.409) 
Managerial Form 0.097 0.950 1.463 
 (1.514) (1.617) (1.461) 
Debt 0.298 0.351 0.095 
 (0.502) (0.475) (0.478) 
Ideology 9.463 -1.708 1.965 
 (7.406) (6.895) (5.415) 
Median Income 1.208 0.293 0.005 
 (1.566) (1.945) (1.918) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel C. Other Taxes 
    
Home Rule Status 4.882 7.380 7.749 
 (5.095) (5.065) (5.656) 
Managerial Form 0.249 0.009 0.719 
 (0.672) (0.847) (0.664) 
Debt 0.108 0.044 0.079 
 (0.176) (0.147) (0.131) 
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Table A4 (continued)  
Ideology 8.529*** 9.139*** 8.390*** 
 (2.664) (2.491) (2.346) 
Median Income -0.053 0.512 -0.426 
 (0.834) (1.050) (0.849) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Panel C. Nontax Revenues 
Home Rule Status -0.134 -0.200 -0.059 
 (0.641) (0.611) (0.644) 
Managerial Form 0.191* 0.183** 0.232*** 
 (0.109) (0.089) (0.068) 
Debt 0.081** 0.067** 0.076*** 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.027) 
Ideology 1.992*** 2.006*** 1.948*** 
 (0.417) (0.303) (0.240) 
Median Income 0.497*** 0.503*** 0.410*** 
 (0.139) (0.119) (0.092) 
Observations 302 417 680 
Notes: Years fixed effect is included but not shown. All outcome variables, debt, and 
median income take the log form. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality 














Table A5. First Stage Estimation 







    
Population≧25,000 0.484*** 0.543*** 0.567*** 
 (0.113) (0.098) (0.086) 
    
Observations 302 417 680 
R-squared 0.495 0.462 0.455 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
















Table A6 Robustness Check with Different Polynomials 
 Linear Polynomial  Third Order Polynomial 













 Panel A. Population Bandwidth 12,500 
        
Home Rule Status -0.694** 5.464 0.459**  -2.105* 16.733 1.289* 
 (0.347) (5.501) (0.212)  (1.239) (17.518) (0.725) 
Managerial Form 0.037 -2.883** -0.029  0.050 -2.983** -0.036 
 (0.069) (1.244) (0.038)  (0.084) (1.280) (0.048) 
Total Revenues  0.900*** 2.712* 1.032***  0.945*** 2.330 1.002*** 
 (0.081) (1.473) (0.051)  (0.111) (1.536) (0.072) 
Total Debts 0.009 0.338** 0.007  -0.017 0.532 0.022 
 (0.013) (0.170) (0.011)  (0.040) (0.387) (0.026) 
Observations 307 307 307  307 307 307 
 Panel B. Population Bandwidth 15,000 
        
Home Rule Status -0.497 4.870 0.631**  -1.165 21.718 2.160** 
 (0.333) (4.847) (0.280)  (1.116) (15.726) (1.055) 
Managerial Form 0.003 -2.380** -0.016  0.007 -2.673** -0.052 
 (0.070) (1.154) (0.044)  (0.071) (1.124) (0.058) 
Total Revenues  0.777*** 3.416** 0.850***  0.776*** 3.376** 0.841*** 
 (0.145) (1.366) (0.144)  (0.143) (1.455) (0.135) 
Total Debts -0.001 0.253* 0.040*  -0.013 0.452 0.055* 
 (0.025) (0.154) (0.021)  (0.027) (0.280) (0.032) 
Observations 417 417 417  417 417 417 
 Panel C. Population Bandwidth 20,000 
        
Home Rule Status -0.502 3.230 0.638**  -1.425 12.891 1.710** 
 (0.369) (4.465) (0.275)  (0.965) (12.077) (0.778) 
Managerial Form 0.003 -2.715*** -0.005  0.016 -2.916*** -0.020 
 (0.058) (0.874) (0.036)  (0.057) (0.835) (0.039) 
Total Revenues  0.858*** 2.955*** 0.875***  0.863*** 3.050*** 0.878*** 
 (0.123) (1.019) (0.097)  (0.115) (0.986) (0.099) 
Total Debts -0.012 0.169 0.041***  -0.021 0.244 0.050** 
 (0.020) (0.150) (0.016)  (0.022) (0.192) (0.021)  
Observations 680 680 680  680 680 680 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A7 Placebo Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
       
Home Rule Status 1.439 -15.620 -1.957 4.957 -85.513 -8.964 
 (1.407) (17.113) (1.427) (10.179) (144.598) (14.353) 
Managerial Form -0.077 -2.299* 0.084 -0.088 -1.917 0.117 
 (0.098) (1.341) (0.095) (0.175) (2.706) (0.241) 
Total Revenues  0.953*** 1.798 0.745*** 0.989*** 0.924 0.662* 
 (0.170) (1.529) (0.175) (0.302) (3.791) (0.341) 
Total Debts -0.023 0.371** 0.052** -0.023 0.320 0.048* 
 (0.026) (0.188) (0.024) (0.024) (0.324) (0.026) 
Race Diversification -0.563** 4.598 0.532** -0.540 4.575 0.516 
 (0.232) (3.458) (0.248) (0.342) (5.601) (0.537) 
Constant -0.409 -22.223 3.719 -2.605 27.560 8.527 
 (3.053) (28.848) (3.135) (9.268) (124.223) (11.938) 
Observations 574 574 574 574 574 574 
R-squared 0.372 -0.281 0.337 -0.692 -4.413 -3.966 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












Table A8 Robustness Check with Covariates 





    
Home Rule Status -0.241 6.672 0.762* 
 (0.482) (7.461) (0.427) 
Managerial Form -0.092 -0.477 -0.024 
 (0.070) (1.129) (0.052) 
Total Revenues  0.799*** 3.494*** 0.828*** 
 (0.132) (1.184) (0.140) 
Total Debts 0.007 0.296** 0.038* 
 (0.023) (0.147) (0.021) 
Ideology -1.198*** 1.435 0.816*** 
 (0.228) (4.312) (0.162) 
Poverty 1.426 8.523 -0.108 
 (1.399) (25.639) (1.300) 
Age 65 0.018 5.312 0.362 
 (0.594) (11.477) (0.498) 
Income Per Capita 0.456** -5.455 0.000 
 (0.200) (3.380) (0.180) 
Constant -2.067 -1.022 1.292 
 (1.949) (41.600) (1.521) 
Observations 417 417 417 
R-squared 0.610 0.213 0.760 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Use Quadratic 15,000 
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